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he Survey year saw a very active legislative session, which combined a fundamentally nonsubstantive revision of Title 1 of the
Family Code with numerous substantive amendments to the Code.
Two useful summaries of legislative changes have already appeared; 1 this
Survey also will mention some of the high points under the relevant topics. Readers should be warned that a single conservatorship decision,
Fowler v. Jones,2 occupies a substantial portion of the discussion this year
because, though not significant in and of itself, the case raises some very
serious questions about the "nonsubstantive" codification process
through which the entire Family Code has been rewritten in the course of
the last two legislative sessions.
Though not strictly on topic, it is appropriate to note that this Survey
year saw the passing of Professor Eugene L. Smith, a true giant in the
Texas family law community. A short memorial by a long-time friend has
appeared in print. 3 Gene Smith played a large part in the drafting of the
* B.F.A., Texas Christian University; J.D., Baylor University; LL.M., Harvard University. Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law of Texas A&M University. Lisa
Moore, a student at the South Texas College of Law of Texas A&M University, assisted in
the preparation of this Article. Professor David Goldstein's comments also helped. Professor David Goldstein's comments also helped.
1. See Stewart W. Gagnon & Howard G. Baldwin, Jr., Laws Regarding the Family,
Terminations and Adoptions, and Protective Orders, 60 TEX. B.J. 794 (1997); Amendments
to the Texas Family Code 75th Legislature, Regular Session (1997), 1997-3 ST. B. SEC. REP.
FAM. L. 6-87 [hereinafter Family Law Section Summary]. The Gagnon and Baldwin piece,
while admirably timely, contains some statute numbers that changed in the legislative
shuffle.

2. 949 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, pet. filed).
3. See Joseph W. McKnight, Eugene L. Smith, 1933-1997: An Appreciation of His

Achievements, 1997-4

ST.

B.

SEC. REP. FAM.
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Family Code, in particular, the provisions on the parent-child relationship. He was instrumental in starting the excellent continuing legal education programs still offered by the State Bar's Family Law Section today.
As a long-time professor at Southern Methodist University, Texas Tech,
and the University of Houston, Gene also influenced an entire generation
of family lawyers and lashed many of them with his trademark caustic wit.
Finally, perhaps as one of his obscure jokes, Gene encouraged a young
lawyer of his acquaintance to take up the teaching profession, advice for
which this writer will be forever grateful. Gene's line, if memory serves,
was, "You're not nearly as dumb as some of the lawyers I know."
I.

FEDERAL DEVELOPMENTS: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE CHILD SUPPORT RECOVERY ACT OF 1992

In United States v. Bailey,4 a long delayed ruling from the Fifth Circuit,
the court reversed a decision by District Judge Biery of San Antonio 5 that
had declared the federal Child Support Recovery Act (CSRA) 6 unconstitutional. In a typical application of the Act, Keith Bailey, a divorced father subject to Texas court order to make child support payments, moved
to Tennessee and stopped paying. In defense to a Texas prosecution
under the CSRA, Bailey argued that the Act was unconstitutional. District Judge Biery agreed and ruled that the Act exceeded Congress's constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause and was an
infringement on traditional state power over the marriage relationship,
exemplified by the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction. 7
Under ordinary circumstances, the Fifth Circuit's decision to affirm the
constitutionality of the CSRA on Commerce Clause grounds would
hardly be worth mentioning. In proposing the legislation, the House Judiciary Committee found that more than five billion dollars was owed by
"deadbeat dads" in 1989,8 that more than half of all child support obligors
who moved out of state sent payments occasionally, seldom, or never,
and that delinquent out-of-state obligors made "a mockery of State law
by fleeing across State lines to avoid enforcement actions by State courts
and child support [collection] agencies." 9 In fact, by the time the Fifth
Circuit ruled in Bailey, six other federal circuits had already held the
CSRA to be constitutional.10
4. 115 F.3d 1222 (5th Cir. 1997) reh'g en banc denied, 127 F.3d 36 (5th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 866 (1998).
5. See United States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. 727 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 115 F.3d
1222 (5th Cir. 1997).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1995).
7. See, e.g. Ankenbrant v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992).
8. See 138 CONG. REC. H7324, H7327 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Hoagland).
9. Bailey, 115 F.3d at 1225 (quoting 138 CONG. REC. H7324, H7326 (daily ed. Aug. 4,
1992) (statement of Rep. Hyde)).
10. See United States v. Bongiorno, 106 F.3d 1027 (1st Cir. 1997), reh'g denied, 110
F.3d 132 (1997); United States v. Parker, 108 F.3d 28 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct.
111 (1997); United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 476 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct.
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What is disturbing, though perhaps not particularly surprising, is the
fact that it took the Fifth Circuit so long to issue a ruling, that the ruling
which finally emerged is limited in scope, and that even this limited ruling
drew a vigorous dissent.11 The Fifth Circuit found that under the threecategory test set out by the Supreme Court in Lopez,12 congressional regulation aimed at deadbeat parents involved "channels" and "instrumentalities" of interstate commerce. 13 The court expressly declined to decide
whether the third category, "those activities having a substantial relation
to interstate commerce," applied.14 Thus, the court placed particular empayments "must of necessity
phasis on the fact that Bailey's child support
' 5
invoke interstate transportation routes.'
Bailey's argument that the CSRA punished him for failing to use channels of interstate commerce, fell on deaf ears. Properly viewed, the Fifth
Circuit explained, Bailey's change of residence caused his debt to take on
an interstate character. The debt, therefore, "continue[d] to move in interstate commerce" so long as Bailey resided in another state.' 6 Moveover, Bailey placed himself in interstate commerce channels by moving
out of Texas. 17 The court stated "[i]f Congress can take measures under
the Commerce Clause to foster potential interstate commerce, it surely
has power to prevent the frustration of an obligation to engage in
commerce."'18
The United States Supreme Court's Lopez decision, characterized by
the dissenting judge in Bailey as a "landmark in constitutional law,"' 19 has
generated considerable uncertainty as to the reach of congressional
power under the Commerce Clause. The Fifth Circuit took what many
observers felt was an excessively conservative position when it decided
Lopez. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in that case vindicated the
Fifth Circuit and established that "Congress's power under the Com258 (1997)); United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 784
(1997); United States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1567
(1997); United States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 753
(1997).
11. The dissenting opinion, by Judge Jerry Smith, began with a concise summary of his
argument. "Rather than rigorously enforcing the limitations on federal power, as Lopez
commands, the panel majority upholds the constitutionality of a statute that contains no
reference to interstate commerce, regulates an activity that is not commercial, and invades
the field of family law, a traditional area of exclusive state sovereignty." Bailey, 115 F.3d at
1233 (Smith, J., dissenting).
12. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
13. See Bailey, 115 F.3d at 1226.
14. Id. The "substantially affects" category for permissible regulation comprised a
substantial part of the dissenting judge's opinion. The majority professed itself "puzzled"
by this analysis and emphasized in a footnote that "we make no effort to defend the constitutionality of the CSRA on the basis that the failure to pay court-ordered child support
'substantially affects' interstate commerce." Id. at 1226 n.2.
15. Id. at 1227.
16. Id. at 1228.
17. See id. at 1228-29
18. Id. at 1229 (quoting United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101, 105-06 (2d Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 784 (1997)).
19. Id. at 1233 n.1 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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merce Clause must have some limits. '' 20 The Bailey dissent attempted to
invoke this perceived new conservatism. 2 ' Therefore, the failure of the
requests for en banc review by the Fifty Circuit and certiorari consideration by the U.S. Supreme Court should give some comfort to supporters
of the CSRA.
II.

THE PARENTAL IMMUNITY DOCTRINE

In the state courts, one decision of general interest to family law practitioners deserves some preliminary notice. McGee v. McGee,22 a child
abuse case from the Waco Court of Appeals, addressed some interesting
issues relating to the parental immunity doctrine. In McGee, a physically
and sexually abused child sued his stepfather and obtained a judgment for
$175,000.23 Trial court pleadings and appellate strategy alike were aimed
toward claiming homeowners' insurance coverage (that is, coverage for
negligence but a policy exclusion for intentional acts), a tactic the appellate court pointedly disapproved.2 4 The court of appeals declined an op25
portunity to infer intent as a matter of law from the stepfather's conduct
and therefore refused to disturb the jury's negligence finding.
The stepfather's immunity defense, however, was another matter. In
Texas, parental immunity has been abolished as a defense in limited circumstances, namely, intentional misconduct and actions arising from an
employment relationship or operation of a motor vehicle.2 6 The immunity rule has been retained, however, for alleged acts of ordinary negligence which involve a reasonable exercise of parental authority or the
exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to provisions for the
20. United States v. Kirk, 105 F.3d 997, 999 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (quoting United
States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 291 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting)).
21. See, e.g., Bailey, 115 F.3d at 1233 (Smith, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]he lessons
of Lopez are lost, however, in the instant case.").
22. 936 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. App.-Waco 1996, writ denied).
23. The judgment was comprised of $20,000 for mental anguish and medical care attributable to the assaults, $50,000 attributable to negligent conduct, and $105,000 in punitive damages. See id. at 363. Only the negligence findings were appealed.
24. The Waco Court of Appeals commented that "several aspects of [the] case are
disconcerting." Id. In particular, the court questioned the validity of an indemnity agreement executed in the prior divorce suit, whereby mother and stepfather agreed to delay
resolution of the tort claims, and the mother agreed to indemnify the father for any tort
recovery not covered by insurance. The court commented on the "irony" of such a holdharmless agreement and stated that the litigation "makes us question the public-policy
considerations that allow agreements designed to facilitate insurance coverage while allowing the insured to effectively escape liability." Id. at 363-64 nn.2-3. The existence of
this agreement did not, the court ruled, constitute res judicata as to the son's claim. See id.
at 364-65.
25. The court found that some of the stepfather's acts were "separate and apart" from
his assaults. Id. at 365. Relying on State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S.S., 858 S.W.2d 374 (Tex.
1993), the Waco Court of Appeals ruled that while intent to harm might be inferred as a
matter of law when sexual misconduct with a minor was involved, the jury was entitled to
find that some of the stepfather's acts did constitute negligence and "were not intertwined
with the sexual misconduct." McGee, 936 S.W.2d at 366.
26. See, e.g., Hoffmeyer v. Hoffmeyer, 869 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex. App.-Eastland
1994, writ denied).
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care and necessities of the child. 27 The court acknowledged that there
might be some question as to whether gross negligence should be classified as "negligence" or "intentional misconduct" for purposes of immunity, but it ruled that under the jury submission in the case at hand, any
28
misconduct was unintentional.
The remaining question was whether a stepparent, who may exercise
parental authority, should be entitled to the shield of parental immunity.
29
One Texas appellate court has extended the immunity to a stepparent,
30
and the Waco court in McGee agreed. The court acknowledged that a
stepparent is not classified as a "parent" under the Family Code, 31 but it
placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the defendant stepfather
was "the only father figure that [the child] had ever known," and that the
child would have been adopted but for the mother's wish that he keep his
biological father's name.32 The court ruled for the insurance company,
and only the claims not barred by parental immunity were excluded by
the policy terms.
Regarding the application of the parental immunity doctrine to stepparents, McGee seems unexceptional, though the logic of the result might
be questioned on more general grounds. While some jurisdictions have
held that a person standing in loco parentis, 33 including a stepfather, 34 is
entitled to the benefits of parental immunity, others have declined to do
so or have construed the concept narrowly.35 If there is any trend, it
might be toward the abolition of parental immunity in general and away
27. See Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 930 (Tex. 1971).
28. See McGee, 936 S.W.2d at 370 (on rehearing). The court noted that the jury was
charged under the then-current statutory definition of gross negligence, namely, "that the
act or omission in question was the result of actual conscious indifference .. " Id. at 370
n.3. The court also commented that "gross negligence could form the basis for another
exception" to the parental immunity doctrine, but it concluded that "we are not so inclined." Id. at 370.
29. See Hall v. Martin, 851 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, writ denied), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1399 (1994).
30. See McGee, 939 S.W.2d at 369.
31. See McGee, 936 S.W.2d at 369 n.1 (on rehearing) (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 101.024 (Vernon 1996)).
32. McGee, 936 S.W.2d at 367 (quoting mother's trial testimony).
33. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So. 2d 801 (Ala. 1992) (foster parents); Bennett v.
Bennett, 390 S.E.2d 276 (Ga. 1990) (grandparents); Brown v. Phillips, 342 S.E.2d 786 (Ga.
1986) (foster parents); Gerrity v. Beatty, 373 N.E.2d 1323 (Ill. 1978) (teacher); see also
generally W.W. Allen, Annot., Responsibility of Parentor Person in loco parentisfor Personal Tort Against Minor Child, 19 A.L.R.2d 423 (1951).
34. See, e.g., Lawber v. Doil, 547 N.E.2d 752 (Ill. 1989); London Guar, & Accident Co.
v. Smith, 64 N.W.2d 781 (Minn. 1954); Bricault v. Devau, 157 A.2d 604 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1960).
35. See, e.g., Newsome v. Dep't of Human Resources, 405 S.E.2d 61 (Ga. 1991) (declining to permit defense for foster parents when children had been removed and placed
with another family); Mayberry v. Pryor, 374 N.W.2d 683 (Mich. 1985) (declining to extend
doctrine to foster parents); Buffalo v. Buffalo, 441 N.E.2d 711 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (declining to permit defense for noncustodial parent); Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786 (Iowa
1981); Gulledge v. Gulledge, 367 N.E.2d 429 (Ill. 1977) (declining to extend to grandparents with temporary custody); Brown v. Cole, 129 S.W.2d 245 (Ark. 1939) (declining to
permit defense for adoptive parents).
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from any expansion of the doctrine to include non-parents. 36 At this
point in the development of Texas law, however, the Waco court's opinion does not seem unduly offensive. The Texas Supreme Court's use of
language referring to the "exercise of parental authority" 37 can logically
be read as referring not only to parents, but to others standing in loco
parentis. While some further restriction or even the complete abolition of
the parental immunity doctrine might be wise, on much the same grounds
that the Texas interspousal immunity doctrine already has been abolished 38 that decision is best made by the Texas Supreme Court in the first
instance.
The McGee panel's other ruling, emphasizing a distinction between
conduct that constitutes merely "conscious indifference" to the child's
welfare, as opposed to "intentional" misconduct that would fall outside
the scope of parental immunity, is more questionable. Although at least
one other court has included grossly negligent behavior within the ambit
of parental immunity, 39 the distinction between gross negligence and intentional misconduct seems thin, and the Waco court recognized as
much. 40 The Texas Supreme Court stated in Felderhoff that the parental
immunity doctrine is restricted to "ordinary negligence and unintentional
wrongs. '"41 The Waco court in McGee quoted this language, but concluded, relying on another court of appeals' summary of the three exceptions to parental immunity, that grossly negligent conduct fits none of the
exceptions. 42 It would, however, be just as reasonable to conclude that
36. See, e.g., Samuel Mark Pipino, Comment, In Whose Best Interest? Exploring the
Continuing Viability of the ParentalImmunity Doctrine, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1111, 1115 (1992)
(stating that "[flar from being established as a steadfast rule, though, immunity for those in
loco parentis has been qualified in a number of recent decisions").
37. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d at 930.
38. In an early decision adopting the parental immunity doctrine, the Tennessee
Supreme Court explicitly analogized the parental immunity doctrine to the interspousal
immunity doctrine. See McKelvey v. McKelvey, 77 S.W. 664, 665 (Tenn. 1903). While
Tennessee has followed the nationwide trend of eliminating interspousal immunity, the
Tennessee Supreme Court has recognized the "continuing vitality" of parental immunity.
See Barranco v. Jackson, 690 S.W.2d 221, 222 (Tenn. 1985). Texas abolished the interspousal immunity doctrine "as to any cause of action" in 1987. See Price v. Price, 732
S.W.2d 316, 319 (Tex. 1987).
39. See Hoffmeyer v. Hoffmeyer, 869 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1994, writ
denied). The Hoffmeyer court also cited Hall v. Martin, 851 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, writ denied), for the proposition that the Texas parental immunity doctrine
covers acts of gross negligence. See Hoffmeyer, 869 S.W.2d at 668. While Hall v. Martin
did involve a "negligence and gross negligence suit," in the court's own terms, there is no
indication in the text of the case that the issue of gross negligence was considered by the
court. See Hall, 851 S.W.2d at 907. To the contrary, the Hall opinion states:
It is important to note that in Texas an unemancipated minor may not sue his
parents for damages based on ordinary negligence involving parental functions. This doctrine encompasses those alleged acts of ordinary negligence
which involve a reasonable exercise of parental authority or the exercise of
ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provisions for the care and
necessities of the child.
Hall, 851 S.W.2d at 910-11 (emphasis added).
40. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
41. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d at 931.
42. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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the Texas Supreme Court's statement defining the scope of parental immunity as encompassing "ordinary negligence and unintentional wrongs"
should be read as implying two negatives; specifically, that gross negligence and intentionalwrongs are not protected by the parental immunity
doctrine. This reading also would be consistent with the high court's
statement in the 1992 Shoemake decision that parental decisions cannot
be questioned in tort suits "[in the absence of culpability beyond ordi43
nary negligence.
The Waco court also expressed concern that a decision not to extend
the parental immunity doctrine to gross negligence would run counter to
the basic public policy objective of parental immunity, which is "avoiding
undue judicial interference with parental discretion. '4 4 Again, however,
this supposition could reasonably be questioned. The Texas Supreme
Court has stated that the purpose of the doctrine is to "avoid[ ] undue
'45
judicial interference with parental discretion not all interference.
More particularly, the Court has stated that the rule of immunity is retained as to "alleged acts of ordinary negligence which involve a reasonable exercise of parental authority or the exercise of ordinary parental
discretion with respect to provisions for the care and necessities of the
46
child."
In McGee, the jury instruction for gross negligence specifically stated
that "gross negligence" means "more than momentary thoughtlessness,
inadvertence, or error of judgment. ' 47 Instead, the instruction required a
finding of "such an entire want of care as to establish that the act or
omission in question was the result of actual conscious indifference to the
rights, welfare, or safety of the persons affected by it. '' 48 Opinions may
differ on the point, but to this reader at least, the conduct necessary to
secure an affirmative answer to such an instruction most assuredly is beyond the bounds of "reasonable exercise of parental authority" or "ordinary parental discretion." In such a case, there arguably has been a
breakdown in the parental relationship sufficient to justify legal intervention. 49 If this is the case, one might reasonably question the McGee
court's conclusion that "[t]o the extent it applies, the [parental immunity]
doctrine protects negligent conduct, no matter how loathsome." 50 That
quite possibly is not, and surely need not be, the law. One might hope,
43. Shoemake v. Fogel, Ltd., 826 S.W.2d 933, 936 (Tex. 1992) (emphasis added).
44. McGee, 936 S.W.2d at 370 (on rehearing) (citing Shoemake, 826 S.W.2d at 936).
45. Shoemake, 826 S.W.2d at 936 (emphasis added).
46. Jilani v. Jilani,767 S.W.2d 671, 672 (Tex. 1988) (quoting Felderhoff,473 S.W.2d at
933) (quoted in McGee, 936 S.W.2d at 367) (emphasis added).
47. McGee, 936 S.W.2d at 730.
48. Id.
49. Accord Sandra L. Haley, Comment, The ParentalTort Immunity Doctrine: Is it a
Defensible Defense?, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 575, 584 (1996) (noting that many states have
created an exception to the parental immunity doctrine for reckless conduct and that
"[s]uch actions by a parent circumvent and step outside of the parent-child relationship").
50. McGee, 936 S.W.2d at 367 n.8.
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even though writ was denied in McGee, that the Texas Supreme Court
eventually will see fit to address the issue.
It might seem difficult to end such a discussion on a light note, but the
Texas Legislature has found a way. In the 1997 session, state lawmakers
addressed what they saw as a burning issue in parental immunity, that
being the prom night "trashing" of hotel rooms. Accordingly, the Legislature not only raised the property damage liability of parents for the
wilful and malicious conduct of their children from $15,000 to $25,000 per
occurrence; 51 lawmakers added a new statutory provision that specifically
defines "occurrence" for hotels as "one incident on a single day in one
52
hotel room."1
III.

STATUS

In 1994 the Texas Supreme Court decided In re J. W. T., 53 which established that a biological father in Texas has the right to assert paternity
claims against the parties to an intact marriage, so long as the assertion of
paternity is accompanied by "early and unqualified acceptance of parental duties."'54 The 1995 Texas Legislature clarified the details of such an
55
action, imposing a statute of limitations and other requirements for suit.
In the 1997 session the Legislature further elaborated on the new statutory scheme. For example, if the mother is deceased, her close relatives
now have standing to contest paternity. 56 More importantly, Texas now
57
has a paternity registry statute.
The new paternity registry statute provides that any man who has sex58
ual intercourse is presumed to know that a pregnancy could follow.
Therefore, the man is required, whether he knows the woman is pregnant
or not, to establish his rights to any resulting child by filing a "notice of
intent to claim paternity" with the state Bureau of Vital Statistics within
could result in terminathirty days after the child's birth.5 9 Failure to file 60
tion of his parental rights without further notice.
51. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 41.002 (Vernon Supp. 1998).

52. Id. § 41.0025(b).
53. 872 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1994). The decision is discussed in detail in an earlier Survey.
See James W. Paulsen, Family Law: Parent and Child, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 47
SMU L. REv. 1197, 1197-1205 (1994) [hereinafter Paulsen, 1994 Annual Survey].
54. See In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d at 198.
55. These changes are summarized in an earlier Survey. See James W. Paulsen, Family
Law: Parent and Child, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 49 SMU L. REV. 1063, 1065 (1996)
[hereinafter Paulsen, 1996 Annual Survey].
56. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.101(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1998) (stating that the
presumption of paternity may be contested by "a person related within the second degree
of consanguinity to the biological mother of the child, if the biological mother of the child
is deceased").
57. See id. §§ 160.251-.263.
58. See id. § 160.254(a).
59. See id. § 160.254(b) (setting out the filing requirement); § 160.256(c) (establishing
the 30 day limit). There is a minor conflict in statutory wording. Section 160.254(b) refers
to the document as a "notice of intent to assert," though the notice elsewhere is referred to
as a "notice of intent to claim paternity." See, e.g., id., § 160.256(a).
60. See id. § 160.258.
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The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the validity of paternity registries. 61 That conclusion is not necessarily binding on Texas, however, because the Texas Supreme Court in In re J.W.T. ruled that Texas biological
fathers have broader rights under state law than those guaranteed by the
Constitution. 62 Nonetheless, the Texas paternity registry statute is likely
to withstand state constitutional scrutiny because the statute is less
sweeping in its scope than it might first appear. 63 For instance, the statute
does not cut off the rights of a putative father who fails to file with the
registry but who does file a legal action to establish paternity before his
rights are otherwise terminated. 64 In addition, the statute requires that a
biological father whose whereabouts and identity are known is to receive
notice of a suit to terminate parental rights whether he has filed with the
paternity registry or not.65 Accordingly, the main effect of the new statute is to substitute a paternity registry for service by publication, which is
' '66
a "wholly impractical method of notice.
Several noteworthy paternity cases were decided during the Survey period. The most interesting of these, principally because of the parties involved, is the appeal following retrial of the venerable In re J.WT.
decision.67 As already mentioned, 68 the original appeal of this case resulted in a notable constitutional ruling on the rights of Texas biological
fathers. 69 In brief,70 husband Randy T. and wife Judy T. were separated.
Judy T. was living with Larry G. and planned to marry him after her divorce was finalized. While living together, Larry G. and Judy T. conceived a child, J.W.T. Before the child's birth, however, Randy T. and
Judy T. reconciled. Larry G. sought a judicial determination of paternity
and visitation rights. While blood tests showed a 99.41% probability that
Larry G. was the biological father, the trial court denied Larry G. stand61. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (upholding New York statute).
62. In In re J. W. T, the Texas Supreme Court noted but expressly declined to follow a
contrary United States Supreme Court decision, Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110
(1989). The Texas court noted that it reached the result, upholding rights of a putative
biological father, "wholly under our Texas due course of law guarantee, which has independent vitality, separate and distinct from the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution." In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d at 197.
63. Cf.Family Law Section Summary (Howard G. Baldwin, Jr. & John J. Sampson,
Introductory Comment), supra note 1, at 43 (stating that "[w]hether the statutory scheme
...will be deemed to be an arbitrary restriction of the natural father's rights is one that
ultimately can only [] be resolved in the courts," but noting that "the most objectionable
aspects of the New York scheme [approved by the United States Supreme Court in Lehr]
do not appear in the Texas statute").
64. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.258 (Vernon Supp. 1998) (stating that a man who
does not file within 30 days of birth is not entitled to contest paternity "other than by filing
a suit to establish paternity before the termination of the man's parental rights").
65. See id. § 161.002(b)(2).
66. Family Law Section Summary (Howard G. Baldwin, Jr. & John J. Sampson, Introductory Comment), supra note 1, at 43.
67. In re J.W.T., 945 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1997, n.w.h.).
68. See supra notes 52 and 53.
69. See Paulsen, 1994 Annual Survey, supra note 52, at 1197-1205.
70. The summary of facts is taken from the Texas Supreme Court's In re J.W. T. opinion. See In re J.W.T, 872 S.W.2d at 189-90.
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ing and dismissed his claim. The Texas Supreme Court held that an alleged biological father in Larry G.'s position had standing to claim
paternity, especially when he had shown diligence in pursuing his paren71
tal rights.
On remand, however, despite the apparently conclusive scientific evidence pointing to Larry G.'s paternity, the trial court ruled that Judy T.
and Randy T. were the parents. The trial court acknowledged that the
blood test results placed the burden of proof on Judy T. and Randy T.,
but it held that they had presented sufficient contrary evidence to meet
that burden. 72 The Beaumont Court of Appeals reversed and remanded
the case for yet another hearing.
The Beaumont court noted in its opinion that under applicable case law
scientific testing that excludes ninety-five percent of the male population,
but that does not exclude the alleged father, constitutes a "prima facie
showing of paternity" and shifts the burden of proof to the side contesting paternity. 73 The evidence offered by Randy T. and Judy T., and
accepted by the trial court, boiled down to nothing more substantial than
a perceived physical resemblance between Randy T. and J.W.T., as well
as similar birthmarks. Contrary evidence, however, was overwhelming.
Randy T. had undergone a vasectomy. 74 Blood tests also proved, in the
words of the lab report, that Randy T. "cannot be the biological father of
the child."'75 Accordingly, relying on a Texas Supreme Court ruling that a
"properly conducted blood test positively excluding the alleged father is
clear and convincing proof of non-paternity," 76 the Beaumont court reversed the trial court's finding of paternity, rendered judgment that Larry
G. was the father, and remanded the case to consider issues of support
77
and visitation.
The trial court's reluctance to accept scientific proof in In re J.W. T is
perhaps a case of post-O.J. Simpson jitters. More likely, however, it is
nothing more than an extreme example of the likely reaction of many
judges to the public policy implications of the original J.W.T. ruling:
"Outsiders" to an intact marriage may have some constitutional rights, in
the Texas Supreme Court's view, but that does not mean that they should
71. Larry G. had arranged and paid for prenatal care, brought an action to establish
the child's paternity before birth, and continued to try to maintain contact with the child.
See In re J.WT., 872 S.W.2d at 189.
72. See In re J. W. T, 945 S.W.2d at 913.
73. Id. (quoting County of Alameda v. Smith, 867 S.W.2d 767, 769 (Tex. 1993)).
Under the current statute, a test excluding 99% of the population but not the alleged father shifts the burden to those contesting the alleged father's paternity. See TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 160.106(c) (Vernon 1996).

74. Randy T. testified that the vasectomy had been reversed but offered no medical
evidence to back up his belief. See In re J.W.T., 945 S.W.2d at 913.
75. Id.
76. Id. (quoting Murdock v. Murdock, 811 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tex. 1991)). The same
result would obtain under the current statute, which provides that "[t]he court shall dismiss
with prejudice a claim regarding a presumed father whose paternity is excluded by scientifically accepted paternity testing."). TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.110(d) (Vernon 1996).
77. See In re J.W.T., 945 S.W.2d at 913.
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expect much sympathy from judges when it comes to the exercise of
discretion.
Consider G.K. v. K.A., 78 for example. G.K., a man having marital
problems, conceived a child during an adulterous relationship with K.A.
He reconciled with his wife, but also filed a voluntary paternity suit. The
trial court found paternity and named G.K. possessory conservator of the
child. However, contrary to the statutory presumption, 79 the court
granted only limited visitation rights until the child reaches six years old.
80
The court also refused to give the child her biological father's surname.
The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed, citing the "animosity and turbulence" inherent in the situation. 8 1 G.K.'s wife, who did not have a high
regard for the mother, would be a primary care giver, and the child would
not be likely to understand the basis of any animosity until an older age.
It is not at all difficult to imagine the trial court, on remand in In re
J.W.T., making similar findings of "animosity and turbulence" that un82
doubtedly also are present in that three-party relationship.
A few other cases, all from San Antonio, are worth brief mention. In
In re A.M.,83 the San Antonio Court of Appeals confirmed that the twoyear statute of limitations for suits by biological fathers when there is a
presumed father applies to suits involving children born before the effective date of the statute. 84 In re J.A.M., 85 from the same court, held that
blood tests do not have to meet the requirements of the business records
exception to the hearsay rule.86 Villanueva v. Office of the Attorney General87 found an Indiana divorce recital that a child was "of the parties"
sufficient to bar paternity litigation in Texas. Finally, the San Antonio
78. 936 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, writ denied).
79. By statute, the standard possessory order is to take effect on the child's third birthday. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.254(a) (Vernon 1996).
80. The Austin court noted a line of cases holding that a father has a protected interest
in having a child retain his surname. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 780 S.W.2d 899, 900 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1989, no writ). The case at hand was distinguished, however, on the
ground that the child had never borne the father's surname, as well as on considerations of
the adulterous nature of the affair that led to the birth. See G.K., 936 S.W.2d at 73.
81. G.K., 936 S.W.2d at 72. The Austin court did reverse an award of attorney's fees in
K.A.'s favor, based principally on the trial court's failure to support the award with proper
written findings or judgment recitals. See id. at 73-74.
82. The court's reasoning on the point is not particularly compelling. Taken to its
logical conclusion, the argument could be used any time a marriage breaks up because of
adultery, and the adulterous couple then marry and request visitation. Of course, many exspouses do not get along particularly well with their replacements, prior adultery or not.
83. 936 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ). The last name of "A.M.,"
by the way, is most likely "Malatek." The opinion refers to the child by initials only, but
identifies husband and wife as Dennis and Tami Malatek, which tends to defeat the purpose of using the child's initials. See id. at 60.
84. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.110(f) (Vernon 1996).
85. 945 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, n.w.h.).
86. By statute, "[a] verified written report of a parentage testing expert is admissible at
the trial as evidence of the truth of the matter it contains." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 160.109(b) (Vernon 1996). At least one prior case has ruled that this statute dispenses
with the need for a business records predicate. See De La Garza v. Salazar, 851 S.W.2d
380, 382 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, no writ).
87. 935 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied).
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court ruled that an order establishing paternity
is final even if the issue of
88
the child's surname remains unresolved.
IV. CONSERVATORSHIP
A number of recent minor statutory changes affect conservatorship issues in Texas courts. Of particular note is the fact that the 1997 Legislature clarified some ambiguity relating to the scope of a jury trial on
custody-related issues. In Texas, unlike other states, the jury potentially
plays a large role in divorce and custody disputes. 89 The general Texas
rule always has been that a jury determines who will be the conservator,
but the judge determines what the terms of the conservatorship will be.
The 1995 statute creating a rebuttable presumption of joint managing
conservatorship 90 arguably undermined the role of the jury by setting up
a presumption of joint managing conservatorship in all cases. If joint
managing conservatorship is presumed, the argument went, then the only
relevant issue-the "detail" of who actually has primary physical possession of the child-would be decided by the judge. The 1997 Legislature
addressed this question by providing that a party is entitled to a binding
jury verdict on the question of the child's primary residence but not on
any other details of conservatorship. 9 1
The 1997 legislative session also modified the circumstances under
which a child's choice of managing conservator will be taken into account. As before, a child twelve years of age or older is permitted to
select the managing conservator, subject to court approval. 92 The Legislature, however, now has reduced from twelve to ten the age at which a
93
party can require an on-the-record interview of the child.
Several amendments address child abuse issues. The Family Code now
specifically permits the admission of hearsay statements by a child twelve
88. In re J.D.G., 940 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, n.w.h.). The gist of
the argument was that, because the Family Code provides "[i]f parentage is established, the
order shall state the name of the child," an order that established paternity but that did not
contain a finding as to the child's surname was not final. TEX. FAM. CODE AnN.
§ 160.006(c) (Vernon 1996). The court, however, placed more reliance on the statutory
language that "[t]he effect of an order declaring that an alleged parent is the biological
parent of the child is to confirm or create the parent-child relationship between the parent
and the child for all purposes." Id. § 160.006(b).
89. This right, however, is not often exercised. Accord Family Law Section Summary
(John J. Sampson, Comment to § 105.002), supra note 1, at 23 (stating that "[i]n truth, jury
trials are more talked about and written about than actually conducted because of the time
and cost involved").
90. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.131(b) (Vernon 1996).
91. See id. § 105.002(c). Advisory issues may, however, be submitted. See id.
§ 105.002(c)(3) & (d).
92. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.008 (Vernon Supp. 1998). The court can disregard the child's choice. Cf Cole v. Cole, 880 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, no
writ) (opining that a court could disregard the expressed wishes of a fifteen-year-old, in a
case in which there was some evidence that the father permitted large parties, left naked
strippers lying in bed, and permitted the boys to drink beer and shoot high-caliber rifles).
93. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.009(b) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
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years of age or younger on the subject of abuse. 94 The finding of a history of family violence explicitly negates the presumption of joint managing conservatorship, as well as the presumption that one or both parents
should be appointed as managing conservators. 95 The statutory provision
that a false report of child abuse is admissible in a suit involving terms of
conservatorship 96 also has been enhanced by a provision for a fine up to
$500 on a court finding that a knowing false 97report of child abuse has
been made in connection with a pending suit.
The 1997 Legislature also added a new category of parties with standing to file suits affecting the parent child relationship. Foster parents now
can sue, provided the child has been in the home for at least eighteen
months. 98 While the new provision removes any doubt as to the right of
foster parents to claim standing independently from the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, it may also have the effect of
restricting foster parent rights. As Professor Sampson has pointed out,99
if one applies the maxim of statutory construction that specific provisions
control over general, this new provision would prevent foster parents
from arguing under a general standing provision that they are persons
who have had "actual care, control and possession of the child for not less
than six months." 10 0
Two cases issued during the Survey period raise an interesting question
of standing and highlight some very troubling statutory construction
problems occasioned by recent revision of the Family Code. Before the
1995 rewrite of large portions of the Family Code, standing was granted
to the catch-all category of anyone who had "actual possession and control of the child for at least six months immediately preceding the filing of
the petition. 10 After the 1995 revision the replacement statute reads "for
not less than six months preceding the filing.' 0 2 The obvious difference
is deletion of the word "immediately."
In re Garcia'0 3 issued from the Amarillo Court of Appeals in April
1997. An unrelated couple with whom the child had resided for "most of
the past two years"' 1 4 brought suit to be named managing conservators.
The mother challenged standing, pointing out that while aggregate peri94. The statute provides that the court must find, in a hearing outside the jury's presence, that the statement is reliable and the child either is available to testify or that the
statement should be used in lieu of live testimony to protect the child's welfare. See id.
§ 104.006.
95. See id. § 153.131.
96. See id. § 153.013(b).
97. See id. § 153.013.
98. See id. § 102.003(12).
99. See Family Law Section Summary (John J. Sampson, Comment to § 105.002),
supra note 1, at 21.
100. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003(9) (Vernon 1996).
101. Act of May 21, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 802, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 2841, 2842
(codified at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.03(a)(8) (Vernon 1986) (repealed 1995)).
102. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003(9) (Vernon 1996).
103. 944 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1997, n.w.h.).
104. Id. at 726.
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ods of possession during that time may have exceeded six months, there
was no uninterrupted six-month period of possession terminating at or
near the time of filing suit, as required by prior case law. 10 5 The Amarillo
court agreed.
The court addressed, in some detail, the effect of the excision of the
word "immediately" in the revision process. The panel bemoaned the
fact that there was no "discovered legislative history, commentary, or judicial decision explicating why the word 'immediately' . . . was deleted
from the rephrasing of the same requirement in the current section
102.003(q)."....106 The court therefore found it necessary to resort to
general principles of statutory construction.
The Amarillo court noted that pre-amendment case law established
that a short break between the "six months possession" and the filing of
suit did not violate the requirement that possession occur "immediately
preceding" the filing. 10 7 The court referred to accepted rules of statutory
construction, specifically, that the Legislature is presumed to know the
existing law 08 and that every omission from a statute is assumed to have
a purpose. 10 9 The parent argued, and the court agreed, that "the deletion
was simply an effort to eliminate the argument that a brief gap between
loss of possession and filing suit would deny standing to bring the action."11 0 The contrary interpretation urged by the nonparents was unacceptable, in the court's view, because it would permit persons with stale
claims to aggregate scattered periods of possession stretching back over
many years and eventually cobble together a "six month" period to establish standing.
Leaving the Amarillo court's public policy concerns to the side for the
moment, the conclusion reached by the court seems very questionable on
its face. The Amarillo court viewed the amendment as "an effort to eliminate the argument that a brief gap between loss of possession and filing
suit" 11 ' could defeat standing. But if the issue was already settled in
favor of standing, as the opinion implies, there was no "argument" to
eliminate; thus, there was no need for legislative action in the first place.
In similarly flawed analysis, the Amarillo court correctly stated that
"an omission in the enactment is presumed to be intentional.' 1 2 However, it then proceeded to interpret the amended language in the same
way that the language would have been read before the amendment; that
105. See Williams v. Anderson, 850 S.W.2d 281, 284 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ
denied).
106. In re Garcia,944 S.W.2d at 727.
107. See id.; see also T.W.E. v. K.M.E., 828 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1992, no writ) (three-week break).
108. See In re Garcia, 944 S.W.2d at 727 (citing Acker v. Texas Water Comm'n, 790
S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1990)).
109. See id. (citing In re Ament, 890 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex. 1994)).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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is, as allowing a brief break between possession and suit. This interpretation arguably makes the amendment meaningless.
Ironically, if the Amarillo court in Garcia had waited a month or two
before issuing its opinion, it would not have had to complain about a lack
of guidance. On July 3, 1997, the Austin Court of Appeals-the same
court that entered one of the two pre-amendment opinions relied upon
by the Amarillo court in Garcia' 13-weighed in on the issue with an opinion in Fowler v. Jones.114 Both the reasoning and the result in Fowler are
contrary to Garcia.
The facts of Fowler are a bit exotic, even for a family law case. Fowler
and Jones were involved in a same-sex communal relationship. Jones
conceived a child through artificial insemination. The child was born in
1992, and the three lived together until the relationship broke up in 1994.
Jones subsequently permitted Fowler to visit the child periodically until
June 1995 when Jones denied Fowler further access and legally changed
the child's surname, which originally had been Fowler-Jones.
Fowler filed suit in October 1995 and claimed standing because she was
a person with actual care, control, and possession of the child for at least
six months preceding the filing of the suit.11 5 Jones admitted that Fowler
had possession for more than six months, in a historical sense. However,
she defended on the basis that Fowler had not had actual possession of
the child since May 1994, some seventeen months before suit was filed.
The trial court agreed that this fact defeated standing and dismissed the
suit.
The Austin Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the Legislature's deletion of the word "immediately" in the recodification process effected a
substantive change in the statute. The court noted that the question "appears to be one of first impression,"' 1 6 evidently because the Amarillo
opinion had not been called to the court's attention. The court first addressed whether the amendment was a substantive or non-substantive
change. This surely was a relevant inquiry, especially considering that the
state is most of the way through a massive non-substantive codification of
the old "Revised Civil Statutes," and the amendment in question was part
of a wholesale renumbering of the Family Code that was begun in the
1995 legislative session and completed in the 1997 session. The court
113. See supra note 102.
114. 949 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, pet. filed) (author's note: Fowler v.
Jones was reversed as this issue was at press and will be discussed more fully in next year's
Survey).
115. Fowler also claimed standing on the ground that she was a "parent." She apparently did not appeal the trial court's adverse decision on this point, nor did she raise a
constitutional challenge to the Family Code's definition of "parent" to exclude same-sex
couples. See Fowler, 949 S.W.2d at 443-44 and 444 n.2. See also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§§ 102.003(1) (Vernon 1996) (stating that suit can be brought by a "parent") and 101.024
(Vernon 1996) (defining "parent" as "the mother, a man presumed to be the biological
father or who has been adjudicated to be the biological father by a court of competent
jurisdiction, or an adoptive mother or father"). Id. §§ 102.003(1), 101.024.
116. Fowler, 949 S.W.2d at 444.
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noted the presumption that a legislative change is intended to be substantive, 117 and observed that the enactment in question contained no18contrary recitals, as would be expected of a non-substantive revision."
Assuming a substantive revision, the Austin court next determined
what change was intended by deletion of the word "immediately." Jones
argued that the word "immediately" was deleted on the ground of redundancy, because the concept of immediacy is implicit in the word "preceding." 11 9 The Austin court turned to a handy dictionary, Webster's Third
New International, and found "preceding" defined simply as "going
before."'1 20 The court commented that "[wie infer from this definition
that the word does not always constitute a qualifier of temporal immediacy.' 2 ' The most logical alternative interpretation, and the one accepted
by the court, was that the Legislature's deletion of the word "immedibefore the filing
ately" meant that "any six month period" of possession
22
of the suit was sufficient to sustain standing.'
Like the Amarillo court in Garcia, the Austin court in Fowler considered the question of whether its ruling was good public policy. Yet while
the Amarillo court focused on the possibility that elimination of an "immediacy" requirement would "sanction[ ] stale claims with their attendant harmful effects,"'1 23 the Austin panel took a broader view, opining
that "[r]equiring the six-month period to precede immediately the filing
of suit could lead to a more absurd result."'1 24 The court explained:
[P]arties who have co-parented a child may separate and try to reconcile, or voluntarily agree to visitation; if their separation becomes
final or difficulties in visitation arrangements arise even one day and
six months after their separation, any step-parent or party not legally
may be deprived of standing to
or biologically related to the child
25
have a hearing on the merits.'
117. See Fowler, 949 S.W.2d at 444 (citing Friedrich Air Cond. & Refrig. Co. v. Bexar
Appraisal Dist., 762 S.W.2d 763, 767 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ)).
118. The statute is titled a "recodification" of statutes. See Tex. H.B. 655, 74th Leg.,
R.S., 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 113-282, 113 [hereinafter Title 5 Recodification Bill]. The statute
does not, however, contain the usual statutory disclaimer of intent to make substantive
changes that one finds in codes passed as part of the state's continuing non-substantive
codification process. See, e.g., TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 1.001(a) (Vernon 1988) (stating
that "[tihis code is enacted as a part of the state's continuing statutory revision program"
and that "[t]he program contemplates a topic-by-topic revision of the state's general and
permanent statute law without substantive change"). To the contrary, section 3 of the Act
states that "It]he enactment of this Act does not by itself constitute a material and substantial change in circumstances sufficient to warrant modification of a court order," and that
"[tihe change in law made by this Act does not affect a proceeding under the Family Code
pending on the effective date of this Act." Title 5 Recodification Bill, supra at 282 (§§ 3(b)
and 3(a)) (emphasis added).
119. See Fowler, 949 S.W.2d at 445.
120. See id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIn NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1783
(1986)).
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. Garcia, 944 S.W.2d at 727.
124. Fowler, 949 S.W.2d at 445.
125. Id.
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Stated differently, the Austin court evidently believed that Fowler should
not be penalized for her attempt to work out an informal arrangement
with Jones before resorting to the courts. 126 Moreover, as the court noted
in closing, a decision that a party has standing does not mean that the
party will prevail but merely that the court will have an opportunity to
decide each case by determining whether the child's best interests would
be served by continuing contact with the party.
Were this the end of the story, one might simply conclude that the
question is ripe for the Texas Supreme Court's attention and move on to
another subject. But the plot thickens. While Fowler was on rehearing,
State Representative Toby Goodman, sponsor of the 1995 Title 5 recodification at issue in Fowler, learned of the language dispute. Representative
Goodman wrote a letter to the Austin Court of Appeals, stating that the
legislation in question was "intended as a non-substantive recodification
bill."' 127 This undoubtedly came as news to both the Amarillo and Austin
panels who, while disagreeing on what the deletion of "immediately"
meant, were in complete agreement that it surely must have meant something.128 Representative Goodman went on to explain that the change
occurred when a computer disk containing the completed bill was referred to the Texas Legislative Council for proofreading and style
changes. 129 For the rest of the story, Representative Goodman attached a
letter from a member of the Texas Legislative Council, prepared in response to Representative Goodman's inquiry.
The Legislative Council letter is emphatic: "The reason this change was
made," it states, "is that the phrase 'immediately preceding' is redundant.' 130 To prove the point, the letter referred to the current edition of
Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, which defines "preceding" as
"that immediately precedes in time or place.' 13 1 The writer then quoted
1 32
the Black's Law Dictionary definition of "preceding," "next before,"'
and pointed out that Black's is "the most frequently cited dictionary in
126. This public policy rationale would find support in recent legislative enactments

urging alternative dispute resolution as an alternative to legal action in family law matters.
See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.0085 (Vernon Supp. 1998) (requiring a boldface
acknowledgement of the availability of ADR in a party's first court filing in family law
matters).
127. Letter from Toby Goodman to Third Court of Appeals, July 28, 1997, reprinted in
1997-4 ST. B. SEC. REP. FAM. L. 31 (1997) (emphasis added) [hereinafter "Goodman
Letter"].
128. See supra notes 108 and 116 and accompanying text.
129. See Goodman Letter, supra note 126.
130. Letter from Mike Marshall, Legislative Counsel, to Rep. Toby Goodman, July 24,
1997, reprinted in 1997-4 ST. B. SEC. REP. FAM. L. 31 (1997) [hereinafter "Legislative
Council Letter"].
131. Id. at 31 (citing MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 916(10th ed.
1995) [hereinafter MERRIAM WEBSTER'S]) (emphasis added).
132. Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1340(4th ed. rev. 1968)). The Legislative
Council letter incorrectly identifies the edition simply as the "4th," but the 1968 publica-

tion date makes it clear that the reference actually is to the "4th revised," rather than the
1951 fourth edition. See BLACK'S

LAW

DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968).
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[attorney general] opinions and [appellate court] decisions. '' 133 The upshot of all this would seem to be, as Professor Sampson wryly observed,
that whether the 1995 change in the statute is interpreted as substantive
or not depends on which dictionary one happens to have on one's
134
desk.
The problem raised by Garcia and Fowler, however, may be considerably more serious than a single instance of "dueling dictionaries." The
Texas Legislative Council exercises pervasive influence over the drafting
of Texas statutes, and now has had a hand in the part-substantive rewrite
of the entire Family Code. Because the explanatory letter presented in
the Fowler case offers a rare window into the arcane procedures apparently employed by the Legislative Council, a somewhat more detailed
analysis is in order. The result of that analysis, in this writer's opinion, is
that the Texas Legislative Council's "non-substantive" substantive rewrite
of section 102.003(9) was inept and that its attempt to defend the result is
disingenuous at best.
To begin, the Texas Legislative Council does not seem to understand
that reference to a dictionary definition, standing alone, is a very dangerous way to decide what a word means. 135 This is why the introductions to
many dictionaries contain disclaimers, such as that found in Black's Law
Dictionary, titled "A Final Word of Caution."'1 36 A dictionary by its very
nature must remove words from context. Unfortunately, the meaning of
words sometimes cannot be understood except in the context in which
those words are used. Take, for example, the sentence, "Do you want
some coke?" The word "coke" means something very different, depending on whether the question is asked at a soda fountain, a crack house, or
an iron foundry.
An easy example of the danger inherent in taking words out of context
is found in the Texas Legislative Council's attempt to explain its unilateral decision to remove the word "immediately" from the statute in reliance on a single line in a general dictionary. "Preceding," according to
Merriam-Webster's, means something "that immediately precedes in time
or place."'1 37 Therefore, the Legislative Council reasoned the word "immediately" is redundant and should be eliminated, presumably to save
the taxpayers a little ink and paper. One thing, however, that didn't occur to the Legislative Council is that any definition that contains the word
133. Legislative Council Letter, supra note 129, at 32.
134. See John J. Sampson, Editor's Note, 1997-4 ST. B. SEC. REP. FAM. L. 32 (1997)
(stating that "[i]t appears this case turned on which version of Webster's Dictionary was
available in the offices of the respective decisionmakers").
135. See generally, e.g., James I. Luck, F. Scott McCown & James W. Paulsen, The Role
of Societal Context in PropositionFormulation,THE FORENSIC, March-April 1978 (on file
with author).
136. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at iv (6th ed. 1990) (stating, in part, that "the type
of legal issue, dispute, or transaction involved can affect a given definition usage. Accordingly, a legal dictionary should only be used as a 'starting point' for definitions.").
137. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S, supra note 130, at 916.
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being defined is not much of a definition in the first place.1 38 More subtly, the Legislative Council apparently did not consider the fact that Merriam-Webster's definition also contains a usage example, namely, "the
preceding day."'1 39 In this context, it is understood that if today is
Wednesday, the phrase "the preceding day" conveys the concept of immediacy. In that specific context, "preceding" does unambiguously refer
to yesterday, or Tuesday. The clarity, however, comes not from the inherent meaning of "preceding," but from use of the definite article "the." If,
by contrast, one simply were to say "a preceding day," the listener could
not be certain whether the day identified is yesterday, last Tuesday, or a
fortnight ago.
If the Legislative Council had looked just a little bit beyond the first
sentence of the dictionary definition of the word "preceding," drafters
would have found other language that ought to have given pause. For
example, while the definition of "preceding" contains the word "immediately," the definition of the word "precede" does not. 140 Moreover, the
paragraph-length usage summary accompanying the definition of the
word "preceding" contains a very telling qualification, that "Preceding
usu[ally] implies being immediately before in time or in place.' 141 The
obvious conclusion is that, if "preceding" usually implies "immediately,"
then at least occasionally it does not. If this is so, as the Legislative Council's own preferred dictionary definition states, then the removal of the
word "immediately" does not eliminate a simple redundancy; rather, the
deletion removes some clarity.
Again, if this were the extent of the confusion, one could just say that
the Texas Legislative Council made a bad call and leave it at that. But
there is more. Not having a Merriam-Webster's close at hand when he
first read the Legislative Council's explanation for the statutory change,
this writer chose the unscientific but decidedly expedient method of simply checking out the definitions in all the word books on his office shelf.
The box score: Of seven books consulted, not one even hints that the
word "immediately" is part of the definition of "preceding.' 42 Add to
138. In other words, how would anyone who consulted Merriam-Webster's to learn what
the word "preceding" meant find out from a definition that contains the very word whose
meaning the reader is trying to ascertain? See generally, e.g., Lee v. City of Houston, 807
S.W.2d 290, 292 (Tex. 1991) (complaining about the uselessness of circular definitions); RR
Comm'n of Tex. v. Ennis Transp. Co., 695 S.W.2d 706, 710 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (denouncing the use of circular definitions).
139. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S, supra note 130, at 916.
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. See AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY 953 (Clarence L. Barnhart et al. eds, 1955)
(defining "preceding" as "that precedes; previous"); AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1030 (William Morris ed. 1976) (defining "preceding" as
"[e]xisting or coming before; previous"); BERGEN EVANS & CORNELIA EVANS, A DICTIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN USAGE 384 (1957) (on file with author) (defining
"precede" as "to go before, as in place, order, rank, importance, or time"); BRYAN A.
GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 680-81 (2d ed. 1995) (defining "precede" as "to go ahead of; to come before"); WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
664 (1949) (defining "preceding" as "[t]hat precedes; going before in time, order, arrange-
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this the Austin Court of Appeals' dictionary research, and one might reasonably wonder whether the Texas Legislative Council, once put on the
spot to explain how a "non-substantive" change has been given substantive effect by a court, had to go to some trouble to find a dictionary that
did contain the word "immediately" as part of the definition of
"preceding."1 43
A further surprise came when the second source relied upon by the
Legislative Council to justify its drafting decision, namely, Black's Law
Dictionary, was examined. The word "precede" does not appear as a defined term in the current edition. 144 The Legislative Council evidently
chose to rely on the two-word definition of "preceding" ("next before")
from a twenty-year-old edition of Black's because it was the last edition
that contained any definition of "preceding.' 45 One would think that it
might have occurred to someone at the Legislative Council, while in the
process of digging back through old editions of Black's, to wonder just
why the definition had been dropped from later editions of the dictionary. The likely reason is simple: It is a terrible definition, by any standard. Put succinctly, the definition of "preceding" in the 1968 version of
Black's is a two-word misquotation from a 1915 Alabama court decision. 146 That definition, in turn, was generaled by reference to highly specific considerations of Alabama public policy 1 47 which are not
ment, etc.; precedent");

THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

1520 (2d ed. 1969) (defining "precede" as "to go before, as in place,
order, rank, importance, or time"); WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1943
(William Allan Neilson et al., eds. 2d ed. 1949) (defining "preceding" as "[t]hat precedes;
going before, as in order, rank, time, or place; foregoing").
143. In fairness to the Texas Legislative Council, however, the writer would concede
that Merriam-Webster's Tenth Edition is a more current, and probably more popular, dictionary than anything he owns.
144. See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990) (not containing a definition of the word "preceding").
145. Another possible explanation is that, due to financial austerity measures, the Texas
Legislative Council does not have any copies of Black's Law Dictionary more recent than
the 1968 revision. The Legislative Council does, however, have state-of-the-art Tenth
(1995) Editions of Merriam-Webster's, so this explanation is unlikely.
146. The definition of "preceding" found in the 1968 version of Black's is "[n]ext
before." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1340 (4th ed. rev. 1968). The Alabama case from
which the definition is derived states that "'preceding' means generally next before."
Smith v. Gibson, 68 So. 143, 144 (Ala. 1915) (emphasis added). Omission of the qualifier
"generally" in the dictionary, of course, gives the reader a sense of certainty that the Alabama Supreme Court in Gibson did not intend to convey.
147. The Alabama Supreme Court in Gibson was comparing a divorce pleading to required statutory terminology. The statute required that a divorce complaint allege residency for the three years "next before" filing of suit. The pleading recited that petitioner
had been a resident for three years "preceding" the suit. The question was whether the
variance in the pleading from the statutory language was fatal.
The broader factual context in which the question was raised was critical. The divorce in
question was approximately twenty years old. The former wife, believing herself legally
divorced, had remarried, and her second husband had since died. The suit was brought by
the deceased husband's children by a prior marriage, who sought to have their stepmother's prior divorce declared void so that the stepmother would not be permitted to
share in their father's estate.
The decision was grounded principally on the fact that the suit was a collateral attack on
a prior judgment. In such a case, under Alabama law, courts had long been required to
(COLLEGE EDITION)
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comparable to the Texas statute under consideration in Garcia and
148

Fowler.

While the discussion has occupied several pages, the Texas Legislative
Council's error ultimately is quite simple: The drafting mistake stems
from a failure to use common sense. When the writer first read the Legislative Council's letter, his reaction was to hunt down some friends
(mainly, anyone who foolishly entered the faculty lounge while he was
present) and take an informal poll. Nine out of ten lawyers surveyed
thought that the word "immediately" did add something important to the
word "preceding," as previously used in the statute. 149 Dropping the
word "immediately" from a statute simply doesn't pass the smell test.
Detailed discussion of definitions only shows that the smell gets worse
and worse the closer one gets to the subject. An elementary principle of
statutory interpretation is that the common usage of words, not some obscure dictionary definition is most important. 150 In other words, rather
than take the Austin court to task for its altogether reasonable conclusion
that deletion of the word "immediately" meant something, the Legislative Council would be more productively engaged in a little institutional
soul-searching to determine how it has become so detached from the real
world on this, and possibly some other, language issues.
A second point worth making is that, even putting definitions of "preceding" aside, the Legislative Council did not do a good job of drafting.
The charge of the Texas Legislative Council, in its statutory revision program, is to "clarify and simplify" the statutes, while making no substan-

construe the pleadings "most favorably for the maintenance of the decree," so that "where
words are susceptible of two or more constructions, [the court should] adopt that which
will sustain the decree." Smith v. Gibson, 68 So. at 144 (quoting King v. Kent's Heirs, 20
Ala. 542, 554 (Ala. 1857)). Thus, if the word "preceding" could be read to mean "next
before," the court was legally required to read it so.
Had the Alabama pleadings rule not come into play, several other public policy considerations might have. Perhaps Alabama, like Texas, construes divorce pleadings liberally.
Likewise, Alabama, like Texas, might exercise a presumption in favor of the validity of the
most recent marriage. And perhaps Alabama judges, as with Texans, have a soft spot in
their judicial hearts where widows are concerned.
148. A final and somewhat ironic point might be made. While the Texas Legislative
Council's zeal in tracking down dictionary definitions of "preceding" that contain the concept of immediacy is in some sense admirable, the Council failed to note a far more relevant definition that was right under its institutional nose. Chapter 312 of the Government
Code, which contains general rules of statutory construction, is located just a flip of a few
pages away from chapter 323, the Texas Legislative Council's organic statute. Chapter 312
also contains some general definitions to be used in all general state statutes, such as the
Family Code. There, the word "preceding" is specifically defined as "when referring to a
title, chapter, or article," as "that which came immediately before." TEX. GOV'T CODE
ANN. § 312.011(11) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
149. The tenth is a noted faculty contrarian on just about any issue.

150. See

TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.

§ 311.011(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988) (stating that, in

construing a code provision, "[w]ords and phrases shall be read in context and construed
according to the rules of grammar and common usage"); id. § 312.002(a) (stating that,
when construing a revised statute, except when used as words of art or the equivalent,
"words shall be given their ordinary meaning").
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tive change. 151 Removing "immediately" surely removes some clarity
from the statute, whether it technically changes the substance or not. In
addition, though, one might also question whether retention of the word
"preceding," when it could have been replaced with the shorter plain
English equivalent "before," does not also represent a missed opportu152
nity to "simplify" the law.
A final and important question is whether, despite all this discussion of
the Legislative Council's drafting error, the Austin court might have
erred in Fowler by refusing to modify its decision on rehearing. Whatever
the linguistics of the matter, one might reasonably argue that the legislative intent is now clear: No substantive change was intended. 153 Therefore, the argument goes, the court should give effect to the Legislature's
demonstrated intent, whether the statutory language accurately reflects
that intent or not.
Unfortunately, the issue presented is more than a little complicated. If
Title 5 of the Family Code had been passed in 1995 as part of the state's
continuing codification program, then the Austin court would have been
directed by the Code Construction Act to give effect to the Legislature's
1 54
intent, whether or not the statute is considered ambiguous on its face.
Unfortunately, this was not simply a recodification. The 1995 revision
was a substantive recodification, a55 in which the Texas Legislative Council
simply was asked to perform its statutory function of providing assistance
in the drafting of legislation. 56 Under those circumstances, the Austin
court arguably was required to follow ordinary rules of statutory con1 57
struction, as it recognized and did.
Thus, while the Austin Court of Appeals in Fowler did not have the
benefit of the "legislative history" contained in Representative Goodman's letter and the Texas Legislative Council's attachment at the time
the original opinion issued, 58 the additional information arguably should
151. See

TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN.

§ 323.007(a) (Vernon 1988) (setting out the principal

purpose of the program as "to clarify and simplify the statutes"); id. § 323.007(b) (prohibiting the Council from "alter[ing] the sense, meaning, or effect" of any statute).
152. See BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 681 (1995)
(recommending that "'preceding,' when used simply for before, is best replaced by that
word").
153. See Goodman letter, supra note 126.
154. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.023(3) (Vernon 1988) (stating that "[ijn construing a statute, whether or not the statute is considered ambiguous on its face, a court may
consider among other matters the ...

legislative history").

155. See Title 5 Recodification Bill, supra note 117 and accompanying text.
156. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 323.006(a)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1998) (stating that
"[t]he council shall ... assist the legislature in drafting proposed legislation").
157. The Austin Court of Appeals clearly understood the situation. The court commented in a footnote that "[w]e apply this analysis, rather than the usual presumption that
the legislature does not intend to effect substantive change by 'codifying' or 'recodifying'
statutes ... because the legislature, in enacting the 1995 amendments, did not purport to
effect a mere 'codification' of statutes." Fowler, 949 S.W.2d at 445 n.4.
158. This discussion proceeds on the basis that comments of an individual legislator and
professional staff "after the event" can be considered legitimate evidence of legislative
history. There are some good reasons, however, for a contrary view, particularly when the
purported "legislative history" is generated in response to a pending court case. Cf C. &
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not have changed the result. In construing a statute, the Texas rule is that
the best evidence of legislative intent is the language of the statute itself. 159 Legislative history is relevant only if the statute is ambiguous or if
application of its plain language would lead to an absurd result.1 60 In
1995, the Legislature took out a qualifying term that previously made it
clear that the six-month period of possession necessary to establish standing must occur "immediately" before suit was filed. The new language is
not ambiguous; it is simply broader than the old. Nor is the result absurd.
As the Austin court pointed out, a rule permitting more people to have
standing simply lets the arguments in relation to the child be heard; it
does not mandate any particular result. 161 Moreover, the result is consistent with the Legislature's recent tendency to broaden statutory grounds
162
for standing.
On the other hand, the Family Code is an unusual document. While
the original 1969 enactment was not part of the state's formal codification
project, one provision of the bill (which, unfortunately, has not been
brought forward as a section in the rewritten document) stated that "[t]he
Code Construction Act... applies to the construction of the Family Code
except to the extent that the context of a provision may otherwise require. ' 163 Thus, through its explicit incorporation of the Code Construction Act, the original intent of the Family Code was to permit
consideration of legislative intent, no matter how clear a statutory provision might be. Before concluding that the Austin court was wrong, however, two additional problems must be considered. First, the 1969
enactment contained only old Title 1, relating to husband and wife. Title
2, which addressed the parent-child relationship and contained the predeH. Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson, 903 S.W.2d 315, 329 (Tex. 1994) (Hecht, J., concurring
and dissenting) (stating that "[e]xplanations produced, after the fact, by legislators are not
statutory history and can provide little guidance as to what the individual legislature collectively intended"); Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. 94-029 (stating that "[a] legislator's after-thefact statement about the intent of particular enacted legislation cannot be used to prove
the intent of the enactment"). On the other hand, the facts of this particular matter-that
the Texas Legislative Council made the changes on a computer disc as part of a "tidying
up" of the statute-seem reasonably clear. See supra note 126. In light of the express
statutory provision prohibiting the Legislative Council from making any change in the
"sense, meaning, or effect of a statute" (at least when drafting subject-matter codes), the
explanation makes a whole lot of sense. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 323.007(b) (Vernon
1988).
159. See, e.g., Government Personnel Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wear, 251 S.W.2d 525, 529
(Tex. 1952) (stating that "[i]t is the duty of courts to construe a law as written, and, if
possible, ascertain its intention from the language used therein ....).
160. See, e.g., Roland v. State, 951 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, pet.
filed) (stating that "the literal text of a statute is the only definitive evidence of what the
Legislature intended" and therefore the "plain meaning" of the statute must be followed,
unless enforcement according to the statute's terms "would work an absurd result, .... ");
Houston Chron. Pub. Co. v. Woods, 949 S.W.2d 492, 497 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1997, no
writ) (stating the exception to the "plain meaning" rule "where application of a statute's
plain language would lead to absurd consequences that the Legislature could not possibly
have intended .... ).
161. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
163. Tex. H.B. 53, 61st Leg., R.S., 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws 2707, 2733.
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cessor section to the provision at issue in Garcia and Fowler, was not
added until 1973.164 Should the provision from old Title 1, referring to
the "Family Code," be taken as extending the Code Construction Act to
interpretation of provisions added later? This writer, at least, is not sure.
Second, even if the Code Construction Act did apply to old Title 2, does
it apply to amendments? The Code Construction Act applies to subsequent amendments of codes enacted "as part of the state's continuing
statutory revision program. ' 165 The Family Code, however, was not formally part of this program, and the language incorporating the Code
Construction Act did not specifically extend its application to later
166
amendments.
No matter what the ultimate resolution of this bizarre and convoluted
issue, the Texas Supreme Court at some point ought to address a statutory construction issue that is becoming more important as the state's
grand statutory codification project nears completion. Does it make any
sense to have a few "substantive" codes or statutes governed by one set
of rules of statutory construction, while the great bulk of the state's laws
are governed by another? Ultimately, it may be better for the Texas
Supreme Court simply to abandon the long-settled "plain meaning" rule
of statutory construction in favor of a new rule that always would admit
evidence of legislative history to clarify a statute's intent, whether a statute formally is governed by the Code Construction Act or not. Until such
clarification is forthcoming, however, it is difficult to determine whether
the Austin court was right or wrong in declining to consider contrary "legislative history" for a statute it considered to be unambiguous.
One final piece, however, must be added to the puzzle. It is possible to
prove definitively that the 1995 deletion of the word "immediately" was
not intended to change prior law, using only methods of statutory construction that do not depend on the Texas Legislative Council's after-thefact explanation of its intent. While its letter discussing the Fowler case
does not disclose the fact, the Texas Legislative Council doctored at least
one other provision in the 1995 revision of the Family Code by omitting
"immediately" from the phrase "immediately preceding." Fortunately,
giving literal effect to the Legislative Council's second effort would create
a result so absurd and so contrary to the obvious purpose of the statute
that the only reasonable conclusion is that removal of the word "immediately" really was not intended to effect any substantive change.

164. See Tex. S.B. 168, 63d Leg., R.S., 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1411.
165. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 311.002 (1), (2) (Vernon 1988).
166. The writer would be remiss if he did not note, however, that a number of judicial
decisions have applied the Code Construction Act to matters of Family Code interpretation without regard for any of the nuances set out here. See, e.g., Lowell v. State, 525
S.W.2d 511, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). One sometimes gets the distinct impression that
the Code Construction Act often is applied not because a court knows about the language
in the original statute but simply because the title "Family Code" contains the word
"Code."
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The change is found in one of the state's more important family law
enactments, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), now
chapter 152 of the Family Code. To be more specific, the Texas Legislative Council's non-substantive tinkering effected a redrafting of the definition of "home state," the very core of the statute. The main goals of the
UCCJA are to "avoid jurisdictional competition" and "promote cooperation" with other states167 by setting up a scheme in which litigation takes
place in a child's "home state." The "home state" is or was, defined as
the state of continuous residence for six months "immediately preceding"
the action. A new home state can be acquired by six month's continuous
residence (temporary absences excepted), but the statute does not envision more than one "home state" at a time. The old state may remain the
"home state," providing one of the parents still resides there, until the six
month period in the new jurisdiction is completed. 168 Otherwise, the
to determine whether
court engages in "significant connection" analysis
169
appropriate.
is
child
the
over
jurisdiction
its
Taken as a whole, the purpose of the statute is to provide an orderly
scheme in which the child never has more than one "home state"' 70 and
17 1
in which current (and likely future) contacts are the most significant.
The Legislative Council's "non-substantive" deletion of the word "immediately" from the definition of "home state" makes hash of this carefully
tailored scheme. "Home state" is determined on the day suit is filed.
Under the old wording, "home state" was defined as the state in which
the child, "immediately preceding" the time involved, had lived for at
least six months. Now, considered in isolation, the post-1995 definition of
"home state" could be any state in which a child has accumulated any six
months' continuous residency at some point in his or her life "preceding"
the filing of suit.
Under any method of statutory construction, such an absurd result-a
one-word change that throws a monkey wrench into a carefully-crafted
statutory scheme-cannot be countenanced. It makes far more sense to
conclude the apparent change was an accident. An even simpler way to
reach the same result would be to note that one of the purposes of the
statute, as with any uniform act, is to make uniform the law of those
states that enact it. 172 A change that would result in such radical divergence from the law of other states should be disregarded on public policy
grounds, unless there is strong evidence that the Legislature actually intended to commit an act of statutory sabotage. From here, it is only a
167.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§152.001(a)(1), (2) (Vernon 1996).

168. See id. § 152.003(a)(1)(B).
169. See id. § 152.003(a)(2).
170. This is shown, for example, in repeated references to "the home state." See, e.g. id.
§§ 152.002(6), 152.003(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
171. See, e.g., id. § 152.003(a)(2)(A), (B) (stating that a court should assume jurisdiction
when there is no home state and the child and a party to the suit "have a significant connection with this state other than mere physical presence" and the state has available "substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection" and so forth).
172. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.001(9) (1996).
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short step to the logical conclusion that, the excision of the word "immediately" from the UCCJA could not have been intentional. Likewise, an
identical change at the same time in the section of the Family Code at
issue in Garcia and Fowler doubtless was not intentional, either. So perhaps the result in Fowler is wrong but only because the Austin court erred
in attributing too much rationality to the Legislature and its minions. 17 3
Other than Garcia and Fowler, the Survey year offers comparatively
little of real interest in the area of conservatorship. The only arguably
relevant decision from the Texas Supreme Court during this period is one
of those "only in Texas" cases that demonstrates that both litigants and
courts sometimes have too much time on their hands. In Ex parte
Shaklee174 the divorce court awarded custody of the children to the
mother and custody of the "four wheeler" to the father. In a strangely
worded order, the children were given visitation rights for the four
wheeler whenever they were in summer school and their father did not
"want[ ] to take it to Colorado to go elk hunting."' 175
The father refused to turn over the four wheeler to the children for a
fifteen-month period. The trial court found him in contempt, stating that
the father had the ability to comply with the court order on any day "he
was not in Colorado elk hunting."'1 76 The Supreme Court declared the
contempt order void on due process grounds because the record contained no specification of the number of days or times the father had
violated the order or whether the thirty days in jail assessed for each offense were meant to run consecutively or concurrently. The Texas
Supreme Court also cautioned that any attempt to carve a continuing
contemptuous act into separate violations could, in some cases, run afoul
of the six-month maximum sentence for criminal contempt. 177
Oddly enough, the Texas Supreme Court elected not to address what
was arguably the most glaring defect in the proceedings. To reiterate, the
order the father was supposed to have violated gave him possession of
the four wheeler "during the period of time he wants to take it to Colorado to go elk hunting."'1 78 Under facts like these, one easily could imagine that at all times the father was not actually in Colorado elk hunting,
he could be found in his garage, caressing his four-wheeler and wishing he
was in Colorado.
One arguably significant and clearly erroneous UCCJA decision of
note, Lemley v. Miller,17 9 has issued from the Austin Court of Appeals.
The parties were divorced in Oklahoma. Lemley, the custodial parent,
173. It might be wise, for reasons that should not require discussion, for the Texas Legislative Council or the Legislature to adopt a strict "hands off" policy toward Texas statutes
that incorporate uniform laws. Failing that, the writer suggests that the Legislature should
at least keep the Texas Uniform Commercial Code out of the Legislative Council's hands.
174. 939 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. 1997).
175. Id. at 144.
176. Id. at 145.
177. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 21.002(b) (Vernon 1988).
178. Shaklee, 939 S.W.2d at 144 (emphasis added).
179. 932 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, no writ) (per curiam).
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moved to Texas for some time and after sojourns in Louisiana and Germany, returned to Texas. Miller, the noncustodial parent, remained in
Oklahoma. The Austin Court of Appeals relied on the UCCJA to confirm jurisdiction over Lemley's request to modify visitation based on two
theories, either that Texas was the child's "home state" 180 or that the
to
child had no home state and Texas had significant connections, access
18
significant evidence, and could serve the best interest of the child. '
The problem with the decision, as pointed out to the Austin court in an
amicus curiae letter filed after the decision was issued, 182 was the court's
initial assumption that "[j]urisdiction in child custody determinations is
governed by the Family Code."'1 83 The truth of the matter is that, in cases
like this, the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) 184 is
dispositive. In particular, the federal legislation would grant Texas jurisdiction to modify child custody only if Oklahoma, the state in which the
divorce was rendered, no longer remains "the residence of the child or
any contestant"' 18 5 or if Oklahoma had "declined to exercise" its jurisdiction. 186 Because neither of these conditions were met, Texas had no
jurisdiction.
Lemley has come under heavy fire from the family law bar, and for
good reason. 187 Nonetheless, one should not judge the Austin court too
harshly. The interaction between the UCCJA and the PKPA can be confusing even to experts, and there is no indication that either party in the
case called the court's attention to the PKPA. Nor did the losing party
file a motion for rehearing. 88 Accordingly, by the time the Austin court
was apprised of the applicable law, it may have felt it lacked the ability to
modify the opinion. 189 Fortunately, Lemley should have little long-term
impact on the law. The El Paso Court of Appeals has already declined to
follow Lemley and has explained its refusal in a pointed opinion.' 90
180. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.003(a)(1) (Vernon 1996).
181. See id. § 152.003(a)(2).
182. See Letter from John J. Sampson and Harry L. Tindall to the Third Court of Appeals (Nov. 21, 1996) reprinted in 1997-1 ST. B. SEC. REP. FAM. L. 22-24.
183. Lemley, 932 S.W.2d at 285.
184. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1995).
185. Id. § 1738A(d).
186. Id. § 1738A(f).
187. See, e.g., Commentary by David Gray, 1997-1 ST. B. SEC. REP. FAM. L. 22 (describing Lemley as "truly terrible" and giving it the 1996 "Stupid [Dallas] Appellate Opinion
Award").
188. Telephone Interview with clerk's office, Austin Court of Appeals (Feb. 18, 1998).
189. Under the rules, a motion for rehearing can only be filed by a "party." TEX. R.
APP. P. 100(a). Likewise, a decision to change the publication status of an opinion is usually prompted by the application of a "party." See id., Rule 90(c). Moreover, the amicusstyle letter calling the court's mistake to its attention was not filed until after the date the
mandate should have issued. See id., Rule 86(a)(1). In the writer's view (which the Austin
court may or may not share), the opinion could have been ordered nonpublished under
Rule 90(c), even after the date the mandate issued. Nonetheless, because the opinion by
that time may have already appeared in West Publishing Company's advance sheets, the
court may have felt reluctant to do so.
190. See Coots v. Leonard, 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 5700, at *16-18 (Tex. App.-El Paso
Oct. 30, 1997, no pet. h.).
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In another UCCJA decision, 91 the Texarkana Court of Appeals held
that a habeas corpus action seeking the return of a child in accordance
with another state court's judgment could be filed in "any district court or
other appropriate court," as stated in the UCCJA. 192 The court refused
to apply a Family Code provision setting habeas corpus actions in the
court of continuing jurisdiction or the county where the child is found, 193
using the rationale that the UCCJA is a "special provision" that prevails
94
over the more general habeas corpus statute.
During the Survey period there were several cases that involved grandparent rights. The Houston Court of Appeals (First District) has ruled' 95
that grandparent standing is not cut off by termination of the parent's
rights or by adoption, providing that the grandparents "request relief, ' 196
defined as "file suit,"' 97 before the termination or adoption takes place.
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals granted mandamus to reverse a trial
court decision temporarily granting primary managing conservatorship to
the deceased mother's parents' 98 on the ground that the affidavit accompanying the petition did not provide adequate proof that the father's appointment would significantly impair the child's health or development,
at least as would be required at the temporary restraining order stage. 199
Finally, the Texarkana court granted a stepgrandmother standing to intervene 200 and eventually affirmed an award of primary joint managing conservatorship in her favor.
In re Rodriguez20 1 presents an interesting and difficult question of public policy. An unmarried mother entered into an open adoption. Unfortunately, she chose to identify the wrong man as the child's father. Two
or so years into the adoption, the biological father found out. The jury
granted managing conservatorship to the couple who had been acting as
adoptive parents, but gave visitation rights to the biological father.
The principal problem, for both trial and appellate courts, was an apparent conflict between the Family Code and Texas Supreme Court authority. Under the Code, a parent is to be named managing conservator
unless "the appointment would significantly impair the child's physical
191. See Revey v. Peek, 951 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, orig. proceeding).
192. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.015(a) (Vernon 1996).

193. See id. § 157.371(a).
194. Revey, 951 S.W.2d at 925.
195. See Bowers v. Matula, 943 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997,
n.w.h.).

196. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.433 (1) (Vernon 1996) (stating that grandparents
can seek reasonable access to a child if, "at the time the relief is requested, at least one"
parent's rights have not been terminated).
197. Cf.id. § 153.432 (a)(1) (providing that a grandparent may "request access" by "filing ... an original suit").
198. See Dohrn v. Delgado, 941 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, no writ).
199. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.131 (Vernon 1996).

200. See In re Hidalgo, 938 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, no writ); see also
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.004(b) (Vernon 1996) (granting standing to intervene in favor
of a grandparent "or other person deemed by the court to have had substantial past conduct with the child").
201. 940 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, writ denied).
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health or emotional development. ' 20 2 In the 1990 Lewelling20 3 decision,
however, the Texas Supreme Court seemed to require an identification of
"some act or omission" by the parent that causes harm to the child. 20 4
The problem in Rodriguez was that, despite substantial evidence "the appointment" would cause harm to the child by disrupting the two-year
bonding process with the adoptive parents, this was not the biological
05
2
father's fault.

The San Antonio Court of Appeals termed this a "difficult case of first
impression" 20 6 and confirmed the award of managing conservatorship to
the adoptive parents. At the risk of boiling an elaborately reasoned opinion down to a catch-phrase, the court concluded that the Texas Supreme
Court's language in Lewelling was an artifact of its facts, not a deliberate
attempt by the Court to read an extra element into the statutory language. 20 7 In dissent, Justice Carr argued that the court was bound by
20 8
"the prism of the Lewelling view" of the statutory requirements.
The Texas Supreme Court's decision to deny writ may be an indication
that the high court approves the San Antonio panel's reading of Lewell2 10
ing.20 9 On the other hand, error preservation issues clouded the case.

In the writer's opinion, the San Antonio panel's ruling is correct. In Rodriquez, all the parties appear to be relatively innocent of wrongdoing.
The biological father still has substantial visitation rights. On an issue
such as this, when one's view of the "rightness" of the result essentially
boils down to a public policy decision, it seems better to prefer the Legislature's language over a possibly unintentional gloss on that language by
211
the courts.
V. SUPPORT
The Survey period was not a particularly active one, so far as the subject of child support goes. The single most interesting development was
the grudging retreat by the 1997 Legislature from a controversial statute
enacted during the 1995 session. That statute, discussed in some detail in
a previous Survey, 212 forbade the issuance of a marriage license to anyone who checked "false" in response to an application question asking if
202. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.131(a) (Vernon 1996).
203. Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. 1990).
204. Id. at 168.
205. Rodriguez, 940 S.W.2d at 267.
206. Id. at 266.
207. See id. at 273.
208. Id. at 275 (Carr, J., dissenting).
209. The writer is aware of the hazards of making such guesses. See, e.g., Ted Z. Robertson & James W. Paulsen, The Meaning (If Any) of an N.R.E., 48 TEX. B.J. 1306 (1985).
210. See Rodriguez, 940 S.W.2d at 274 n.2 (discussing possible waiver of error in jury
charge).
211. The Rodriguez court did point out that, in a decision that postdates Lewelling, the
Texas Supreme Court simply quoted the statutory language, rather than Lewelling. See
Rodriguez, 940 S.W.2d at 273 (citing Brook v. Brook, 881 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. 1994)).
212. See Paulsen, 1996 Annual Survey, supra note 54 at 1078-80.
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he or she was current on child support obligations. 213 The legislative intent, of course, was to prohibit anyone behind on child support obligations from entering into any new relationships that might produce still
more children.
The problem with this legislation, or so this writer and others opined
when it first was enacted, 2 14 was that the United States Supreme Court
had long since declared similar schemes to be invalid. In Zablocki v.
Redhail,21 5 the Court opined that a Wisconsin statute similar to the Texas
enactment was unconstitutional because it "significantly interfere[d]"
with a fundamental right, the right to marry. 21 6 A 1996 Texas Attorney
General opinion concluded that the new Texas statute shared the same
217
infirmity.
The sole arguable difference between the Texas statute and the Wisconsin statute held invalid in Zablocki was that, unlike Wisconsin, Texas recognizes the institution of informal marriage. This distinction was
highlighted in an article in the Baylor Law Review21 8 which argued that
"[t]he A.G. Opinion should be withdrawn" and the Texas statute should
be held valid because, due to the unrestricted availability of informal
marriage, the "Texas legislation neither deprives the indigent of a constitutionally protected liberty interest nor directly and substantially inter21 9
feres with one's fundamental right to marry.
This writer respectfully disagrees. To the extent that the availability of
informal marriage would have helped the Texas legislation avoid the
shoals of Zablocki, the enactment would have foundered on the rocks of
the equally fundamental First Amendment guarantee of free exercise of
religion. While informal marriage confers the same civil status as does an
executed marriage license in Texas, state statutes arguably prohibit
priests, rabbis, and other religious functionaries from performing a marriage unless the parties have a valid marriage license.220 Thus, the statute
would have infringed the religious rights of those who view marriage as a
religious sacrament, but who are not current in child support. 2 21 Moreover, the "common law alternative" argument proves too much. If the
213. Act of May 26, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 655, § 5.04 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 3543,
3559 (amended 1997) (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.004 (Vernon Supp.
1998)).
214. See, e.g., Paulsen, 1996 Annual Survey, supra note 54 at 1079-80.
215. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
216. Id. at 383.
217. See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. DM-384 (1996).
218. See R. Michael Rogers, Use of the Texas Marriage License Statutes as a Child Support Collection Device Does Not Violate Equal Protection,48 BAYLOR L. REV. 1153 (1996).
219. Id. at 1170.
220. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.202-.203, 2.206 (Vernon Supp. 1997).
221. The Baylor Law Review article contains a telling qualification. After stating in text
that "[c]ase law does not indicate that there is an equal protection right to a licensed wedding ceremony," Professor Rogers adds in a footnote: "A first amendment free exercise
issue may exist regarding a right to a religious ceremony; however, that was not addressed
in the Attorney General Opinion, and is beyond the scope of this Article." Rogers, supra
note 216 at 1162 n.35.
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statute really does not impede the right of a delinquent child support obligor to remarry, then it would be questionable whether the statute could
a "rational basis" analysis, much less survive "strict
pass muster under
222
scrutiny" review.
In any event, Texas courts will not be required to address the issue
since the 1997 Legislature repealed the restriction. As amended, a delinquent child support obligor must still indicate that status on a marriage
license application; 223 the clerk, however, is specifically forbidden from
refusing to issue a license on that ground.2 2 4 The apparent intent of the
Legislature was to assure that a prospective spouse be "fully informed
about the character of his or her choice in a mate."22 5 However, the statute does not require the disclosure of information such as whether the
disapplicant is a convicted felon, has a history of sexually transmitted
226
eases, or is currently heading into his or her eighth marriage.
A large number of technical amendments affecting support were made
in the 1997 legislative session, as well as several substantive amendments,
designed to streamline the process of determining and collecting child
support. The most significant change is the new provision that authorizes
modification of child support merely on a showing that three years have
passed since the last support order, and that support now deviates from
the guidelines by at least twenty percent or one hundred dollars per
month.2 27 The problem of ensuring health insurance coverage was addressed through new provisions for cash medical support payments when
other insurance is unavailable, together with presumptive guidelines for
those payments. 228 Wage withholding orders are now required in all in230
stances,2 29 though service of the order on employers is not automatic.
A child support lien now automatically arises whenever support is overdue, providing other statutory prerequisites are met. 231 Support for a disabled adult child can now flow directly to that child 232 and parties may
agree that a contingency provided for in a court order (death, high school
graduation, removal of disabilities, etc.) has occurred without the require222. Professor Rogers disputes this contention, and cites anecdotal evidence of a Travis
County clerk who believed that "at least four, perhaps six" individuals paid delinquent
child support before securing a marriage license. Id. at 1169 (quoting Dana DeBeauvoir,
Travis County Clerk). Given the fact that the Travis County clerk's office was apparently
the only one to continue zealous enforcement of the statute in the face of an attorney
general's opinion questioning its constitutionality, one might reasonably wonder whether
these individuals were informed of their "common law" alternative. See id. at 1169.
223. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.004(7) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
224. See id. § 2.009(d).
225. Family Law Section Summary, supra note 1, at 7.
226. Cf id. (stating "Don't you just love it?").
227. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 156.401(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
228. See id. § 154.182(b)(4)-(6).
229. See id. § 154.007(a).
230. See id. § 158.002.
231. See id. § 157.312(d).
232. See id. § 154.302(b). The adult child is granted standing to sue for enforcement.
See id. § 154.303(a).

1118

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

ment of an additional court order. 233
by
One support decision involving a contempt proceeding was issued 234
the Texas Supreme Court during the Survey period. In Ex parteAcker,
the former wife challenged two contempt orders. The first contempt
claim arose from Acker's failure to abide by the terms of an agreed order
on arrearages. Acker argued that, contrary to the statute, she was not
informed of her right to counsel in the original hearing. 235 A unanimous
Court ruled that the Family Code's requirement that "incarceration is a
possible result of the proceedings" '236 was satisfied by the agreed order's
alternative provision for commitment to jail if Acker did not abide by the
terms of the order. The Court also ruled that, while the right to appointed counsel might be limited to indigent parties, the statute requires
not, to, at a minimum, be informed of their right to
all parties, indigent or
23 7
legal representation.
The Court was not unanimous in its ruling on Acker's second complaint. The divorce decree required Acker to pay fifty dollars per month
in health insurance beginning "on the 1st day of June. '23 8 The problem
was that the decree did not specify a year. Acker resolved this ambiguity
in her favor by not paying health insurance support for six years, whereupon she was held in contempt.
Chief Justice Phillips, writing for the majority, noted that "June" probably referred to "June 1990," since the divorce hearing was held in May
of that year.239 Nonetheless, because a decree must "set forth the terms
of compliance in clear, specific and unambiguous terms" to be enforceable by contempt, 240 and because the order was not signed until November
1990, the Court ordered Acker discharged. Writing for the three dissenting justices, Justice Priscilla Owen argued that "[e]ven if [Acker] was uncertain in her own mind about whether her obligations commenced on
June 1 of 1990 or June 1 of 1991, she knew that those obligations began
' 24 1
on June 1, 1991 at the latest."
Reyes v. Reyes, 242 a decision from the Waco Court of Appeals, is initially troubling in its result, but somewhat more palatable on close reading. In Reyes, the Waco court upheld a trial court decision to the effect
that a prison sentence constitutes "voluntary underemployment. '24 3 At
233. See id. § 158.402.
234. 949 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. 1997).
235. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 157.163(b) (Vernon 1996)(providing that "[i]f the

court determines that incarceration is a possible result of the proceedings, the court shall
inform a respondent not represented by an attorney of the right to be represented by an
attorney and, if the respondent is indigent, of the right to the appointment of an
attorney").
236. Id.
237. This conclusion seems to follow naturally from a plain reading of the statute.
238. Acker, 949 S.W.2d at 316.
239. Id. at 317.
240. Id. at 317 (quoting Ex parte Chambers, 898 S.W.2d 257, 260 (Tex. 1995)).
241. Id. at 319 (Owens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
242. 946 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, n.w.h.).
243. Id. at 628.
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the time of the support hearing, Reyes was halfway through a twelve year
sentence for sexually assaulting his wife's underage niece. Though eligible for parole, Reyes was still incarcerated at the time of the hearing.
The trial court nonetheless imposed a monthly support obligation consistent with what a person employed forty-hours per week in a minimum
wage job would earn.
Though startling on first reading, the Waco court's decision to affirm
can be understood as a combination of extreme deference to the trial
court's rulings, combined with severe procedural defaults on the part of a
pro se litigant. While the Waco court discussed the facts in some detail,
the actual holding was narrow. The court observed that when no evidence is presented of a spouse's actual income, a trial court should pre244
sume employment at a forty-hour per week minimum wage job.
Because the inmate spouse presented no evidence of his net resources or
his "alleged inability to earn an income while incarcerated, ' 24 5 the Waco
court ruled that the trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion in applying the statutory presumption.
Two observations about the Waco court's opinion are in order. First,
the ruling is extraordinarily harsh in its application of rigid pleading and
error preservation rules to a pro se litigant. The inmate presented no
evidence of his net resources, or of his inability to earn money, because
he was not present at the hearing. Some record evidence supported the
inmate's claim that the trial court failed to issue a requested bench warrant to compel his appearance, but the Waco Court of Appeals declined
to consider the point because the inmate had not formally requested inclusion of the motion for a bench warrant as a part of the record and had
not raised the trial court's failure to rule on the motion by point of error.
Likewise, the inmate's argument that the trial court failed to consider his
"Declaration of Inability to Pay Child Support" was dismissed because
the document was not part of the record. 246 This is understandable, however, since the inmate was not present at trial to urge its admission. From
a strictly procedural point of view the Waco court's decision may not be
objectionable, but it certainly leaves a reader with little confidence that
247
justice was done.
The second point that deserves emphasis is the fact that the rationale
bears little resemblance to what actually happened at trial. Judging from
the Waco court's rendition of the facts, the trial court did not rely on the
inmate's failure to present evidence of resources. Rather, the Attorney
General's Office urged the fact of Reyes' incarceration be considered as
evidence of voluntary underemployment, specifically, that the decision to
commit the crime was voluntary, though the resulting imprisonment
244. See id. at 630.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. One might reasonably wonder why the trial court was not required to take judicial
notice of the general unavailability of 40 hour, minimum wage jobs in prison.
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might be involuntary. Likewise, Reyes' ex-wife did not rely on the statutory presumption. Rather, she presented evidence that Reyes was capable of earning the minimum wage as proof of baseline employability.
Evidently the trial court believed that parole was likely when it set the
level of support, because the court commented that a future motion to
quash collection efforts might be warranted if Reyes continued to be
incarcerated.
This case appears to be an effort by the Attorney General's Office to
implement a policy to impose child support obligations on prison inmates,
despite severe doubts as to the wisdom of that policy. At trial, the exwife's attorney announced that "a representative from the Attorney General's Office had asked him to request from the trial court that child support be awarded retroactively to the date when [Reyes] was first
incarcerated. '248 The trial court "expressed its view that a parent should
not be required to pay child support if he is incarcerated and, consequently, without an income or other ability to make child support payments. '249 On appeal, the ex-wife did not attend the hearing. Instead,
the case was briefed and argued by representatives from the Attorney
General's Office.
For what it is worth, particularly since the problem may arise again, this
writer would join with the trial court in expressing doubt as to the soundness of the Attorney General's argument. The fact that Reyes and most
other inmates are not sympathetic defendants should not blind one to
some of the severe problems faced by the Attorney General's position.
To call a prison sentence "voluntary underemployment" is equivalent to
calling death a failure to exercise visitation rights. The Attorney General's position is black humor, not sober statutory construction.
Moreover this position, if persisted, begs for a constitutional challenge.
The logical consequence of child support orders that view a prison sentence as voluntary underemployment is a termination proceeding based
on failure to support the child, or perhaps a criminal nonsupport action. 250 Surely, the same conduct that lands a parent in prison can be
grounds for termination of parental rights. Indeed, by virtue of a 1997
legislative amendment, voluntary criminal conduct that results in a twoyear prison sentence now is an independent ground for termination of
parental rights. 251 Here, however, a parent's rights could ultimately be
terminated not for bad conduct, but by reason of indigency alone. That
result would be contrary to the intent of the Family Code's support provisions25 2 and is a likely violation of the United States Constitution as well.
248. Reyes, 946 S.W.2d at 628.
249. Id.
250. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 25.05 (Vernon 1994).
251. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(Q) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
252. A more equitable interpretation of the Texas Family Code was presented during
the Survey period by In re D.L.B., 943 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, n.w.h.).
The court noted:
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Other cases from the courts of appeals are considerably more mundane. The Tyler Court of Appeals has held, in a ruling arguably contrary
to the prior conclusion of the Beaumont court,2 53 that a child support
contemnor who has been placed on probation is not sufficiently deprived
of his liberty to seek a writ of habeas corpus. 254 The Houston Court of
Appeals (Fourteenth District) held in a criminal case that a prior contempt proceeding does not bar prosecution for criminal child support on
double jeopardy grounds. 2 55 The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals has
ruled that so far as responding to wage withholding orders is concerned, a
nonemployer is not held to the same pleading deadlines as an
256
employer.
Finally, several cases on the computation of support deserve brief mention. The Dallas Court of Appeals ruled that income tax returns are not
conclusive on the question of an obligor's income, in part because "calculations prepared under one set of rules do not necessarily comply with the
requirements of the other. '2 57 The court therefore gave credence to the
obligor's injudicious statements to his ex-spouse about unreported income and gold reserves held in European banks. Two cases out of San
Antonio relate to the question of voluntary underemployment. In one,
the court declined to address the question of whether a forty-three-yearold man with a B.B.A. from the University of Texas was really capable of
earning only five dollars per hour as a mechanic's helper by ruling that he
still had substantial resources, including investments and a home, that
could be reached to meet support obligations. 258 In the second case, the
San Antonio court held that an obligor who quit his second job in order
to prepare for law school should be considered voluntarily underemployed and held to the support level derived from his previous income
level.

259

The fact that the parent is incarcerated can contribute to a finding that the
parent engaged in a course of conduct which endangered the child's physical
or emotional well-being ....If the conduct for which the parent is incarcer-

ated shows voluntary and deliberate actions, it qualifies as conduct endangering the emotional well-being of a child.... Termination cannot be based on
failure to support the child unless there is also evidence of the ability to pay
support.
Id. at 177 (citations omitted).
253. See Ex parte Connor, 746 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1988, orig. proceeding) (holding that probation constitutes a sufficient restraint on liberty to warrant the writ).
254. See Ex parte Hughey, 932 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1996, orig. proceeding).
The Tyler court stated that it would decline to follow the Beaumont court's decision in Ex
parte Connor "[a]bsent a more detailed recitation of the facts and a more persuasive analysis." Ex parte Hughey, 932 S.W.2d at 310.
255. See State v. Johnson, 948 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.
h.).
256. See Dotzler v. Coldwell Banker Island Realtors, 941 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1997, n.w.h.).
257. Hudson v. Markum, 948 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, writ denied).
258. See In re G.J.S., 940 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, n.w.h.).
259. See In re S.B.C., 952 S.W.2d 15 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, n.w.h.).
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TERMINATION AND ADOPTION

In M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,260 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the state of
Mississippi could not condition an appeal from an order terminating parental rights on the mother's advance payment of transcript preparation
fees. The Court held that the state could not deny the mother, "because
of her poverty, appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence on
which the trial court found her unfit to remain a parent."' 261 The Court
further explained that while the Constitution does not guarantee a right
to an appeal, 262 once the state has granted that right, it may not "bolt the
263
door to equal justice."
Several recent Texas courts of appeal decisions have grappled with an
analogous question. The requirement that the grounds for termination of
parental rights be proved by "clear and convincing evidence" is not only
required by Texas statute2 64 but the heightened standard of proof is also
required by the U.S. Supreme Court. 265 But what should the standard of
review be on appeal?
Over the past few years, a deep division in opinion on the question has
developed among the various courts of appeal. Beginning with a 1982
Dallas decision,2 66 followed by decisions from Amarillo, Houston (First
District) and San Antonio,2 67 as well as a couple of law review commentators,2 68 Courts have stated or intimated that a "clear and convincing"
standard at trial should require different treatment on appeal. Other
courts, including Austin, Corpus Christi, Fort Worth, Houston (Fourteenth District) and Texarkana, 269 now seem to favor an unaltered standard of review, even though earlier decisions from most of those courts
260. 117 S.Ct. 555 (1996).
261. Id. at 559.
262. Id. at 560 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 315 U.S. 12, 24 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)).
263. Id. at 560 (quoting Griffin, 315 U.S. at 24); see also Ex parte Shumake, 953 S.W.2d
842, 843-44 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, no pet. h.) (discussing the constitutional standards in
a criminal context).
264. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (Vernon 1996).
265. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769-70 (1982).
266. See Neiswander v. Bailey, 645 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ); see
also Wetzel v. Wetzel, 715 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
267. See, e.g., Neal v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs., 814 S.W.2d 216, 222 (Tex. App.San Antonio 1991, writ denied); Williams v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs., 788 S.W.2d 922,
926 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ); In re L.R.M., 763 S.W.2d 64, 66-67
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ); In re Estate of Glover, 744 S.W.2d 197, 199 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1987), writ denied per curiam, 744 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. 1988).
268. See W. Wendell Hall, Revisiting Standards of Review in Civil Appeals, 24 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 1041, 1149 (1993); Justice Bill Vance, The Clear and Convincing Evidence
Standard in Texas: A Critique, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 391, 412-16 (1996).
269. See, e.g., In re J.J., 911 S.W.2d 437, 439-40 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, writ denied); In re W.S., 899 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ); Oadra v.
Stegall, 871 S.W.2d 882, 892 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ); D.O. v. Texas
Dep't of Human Servs., 851 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, no writ); In re
A.D.E., 880 S.W.2d 241, 245 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ).
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suggested otherwise. 270 The situation remains confused. Even the Dallas
Court of Appeals, responding to recent criticism that its own cases set out
conflicting standards, admitted that "the cases cause confusion" before
concluding with the assurance that they "can be reconciled. '271
In two cases, both issued May 8, 1997,272 the El Paso Court of Appeals
addressed the question in some detail and cast its lot with the "different
standard of review" courts. If one adds in a decision by the Waco Court
of Appeals that issued after the Survey period ended, 273 this makes a
near even split among the courts, with perhaps a slight edge to the "dif274
ferent standard" courts.
As the El Paso court observed in Edwards v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services,2 7 5 those Texas courts that do not to apply
a heightened standard of review rely on statements in older Texas
Supreme Court cases, to the effect that there are only two standards of
review on appeal, factual sufficiency and legal sufficiency. 276 The problem with relying on those cases, however, as even one court that follows
the decisions has remarked, 277 is that they were written at a time when
the Texas Supreme Court recognized only one standard of proof-preponderance of the evidence-at trial. 278 The El Paso court believed that

because the underlying basis of the decisions changed, 279 the apparent
mandate of those early cases need not be followed. Moreover, added the
court, "we find it incongruous to require the trial court to apply a higher
standard of proof when deciding the case while requiring the appellate
court to use the same standard of review as in cases decided by a preponderance of the evidence. '28 0
270. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs., 869 S.W.2d 574, 580 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ); In re L.R.M., 763 S.W.2d at 66; G.M. v. Texas Dep't
of Human Resources, 717 S.W.2d 185, 186 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, no writ).
271. Combs v. Dallas County Child Protective Servs., No. 05-96-00484-CV, 1997 WL
499689 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 25, 1997, pet. filed) (not designated for publication under
TEX. R. App. P. 90(i)).
272. See In re B.R., 950 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, n.w.h.); Edwards v.
Texas Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 946 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997,
n.w.h.); cf. In re G.B.R., 953 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, n.w.h.) (raising the
same issue in the context of a Branch Davidian civil commitment appeal).
273. See Spangler v. Texas Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 962 S.W.2d 253
(Tex. App.-Waco 1998, no pet. h.).
274. It also is worth noting that, during the Survey period, the San Antonio Court of
Appeals recognized that "the courts of appeal have disagreed over whether an intermediate standard of review should be used," but reaffirmed its commitment to an intermediate
standard. In re H.C., 942 S.W.2d 661, 663 n.2 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, n.w.h.).
275. 946 S.W.2d at 136.
276. See State v. Turner, 556 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tex. 1977); Meadows v. Green, 524
S.W.2d 509 (Tex. 1975).
277. See In re J.J., 911 S.W.2d 437, 440 n.1 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, writ denied).
278. See, e.g., Turner, 556 S.W.2d at 566 (stating that civil commitment requires only a
"preponderance of the evidence" burden at trial).
279. See In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980) (recognizing that clear and convincing evidence is required in proceedings for involuntary termination of parental rights).
280. Edwards, 946 S.W.2d at 136-37.
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With one or two exceptions, 2 81 the Texas appellate courts that have
wrestled with this issue have chosen not to look to other state jurisdic2 82
Decitions for guidance. If they had, it would not have helped much.
court's
trial
of
the
sions range from an insistence on de novo analysis
ruling, 283 through some form of heightened review, 284 to deferential 285 or
281. The first Texas case to address the question did look to two California decisions for
guidance. See Neiswander,645 S.W.2d at 835-36); see also In re L.R.M., 763 S.W.2d at 6566 (citing decisions from nine other jurisdictions).
282. Readers should not place undue reliance on the lists that follow. The labeling and
application of standards of review are often idiosyncratic, and proper interpretation requires more knowledge of the particular jurisdiction's jurisprudence. For example, while
Idaho appears to follow a "clearly erroneous" standard of review in termination cases, as
in other civil cases, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated that it actually applies a "de facto"
standard.
The substantial evidence or clearly erroneous standard of appellate review
...is not applied identically in all instances: the appellate standard of review
parallels the trial court's burden of proof. Obviously, the substantial evidence test requires a greater quantum of evidence in cases where the trial
court finding must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, in
termination proceedings, if there is evidence in the record from which the
trial court may properly conclude that the issue has been resolved by clear
and convincing evidence, the appellate court will not set that resolution
aside.
In re Aragon v. State Dep't of Health and Welfare, 818 P.2d 310, 317 (Idaho 1991) (quoting
In re Bush, 749 P.2d 492, 495 (Idaho 1988)).
283. See, e.g., In re E.B.L., 501 N.W.2d 547, 549 (Iowa 1993) (applying a de novo standard of review, though recognizing that the reviewing court can "give weight" to the trial
court's conclusions, in light of that court's greater ability to gauge the evidence); In re
J.L.M., 451 N.W.2d 377, 382 (Neb. 1990) (stating a de novo standard of review but adding
that "where evidence is in conflict, the Supreme Court considers and may give weight to
the fact that the trial court observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts
rather than another"); J.S.P.L. v. Wessman, 532 N.W.2d 653, 664 (N.D. 1995) (stating that
"[o]ur standard of review is similar to trial de novo"); S. v. Jenkins, 651 P.2d 1374, 1375
(Or. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that "we must apply the higher standard of proof in our de
novo review of the record"); Farmer v. Dep't of Children Servs., 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS
938, at *18 (Ct. App., Dec. 30, 1997) (stating that "[t]he standard of review by this Court of
a decision terminating parental rights is de novo upon the record with the presumption of
correctness of the findings of fact by the Trial Court"); cf. In re Adoption of Olopai, 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7272, at *2-3 (N. Mar. I. App. Div., Apr. 30,1990) (citing In re Nalani C.,
245 Cal. Rptr. 264, 267 (Ct. App. 1988)) (stating that "[t]he standard for review is de novo"
but adding that, "[a]pplying the substantial evidence test, the Court must review the record
in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether a reasonable trier
of fact could find that the termination of parental rights is appropriate based on clear and
convincing evidence"); West Virginia Dep't of Health & Human Res., 489 S.E.2d 281, 286
(W. Va. 1997) (implying a plenary standard of review).
284. See, e.g., In re Nalani C., 245 Cal. Rptr. at 267 (stating that the court applies the
"substantial evidence" test, but explaining that the test involves a search of the entire record to determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that termination of parental
rights was supported by "clear and convincing" evidence); In re Jones, 538 A.2d 1113 at 6
(Del. 1988) (stating that "[tihe standard of review that applies to termination of parental
rights appeals is whether the findings of fact are supported by clear and convincing evidence and are the product of an orderly and logical deductive process"); Blackburn v.
Blackburn, 292 S.E.2d 821, 826 (Ga. 1982) (stating that, in a manner similar to criminal
appeals, the test is "whether after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
appellee, any rational trier of fact could have found by clear and convincing evidence that
the natural parent's rights to custody have been lost"); In re C.D. v. Tippecanoe County
Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 614 N.E.2d 591, 598 (Ind.Ct. App. 1993) (stating that "[j]ust as the
burden of proof below is substantially enhanced when, as here, constitutional rights and
liberties are put at civil risk, the standard of review at the appellate level is correspond-
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ingly more stringent" and expressing the review standard as "whether substantial 'clear
and convincing' evidence was presented below which supports the trial court's judgment");
In re Brianna K., 675 A.2d 980, 982 (Me. 1996) (stating that "the appropriate standard of
appellate review is whether the factfinder could reasonably have been persuaded that the
required factual findings were proved to be highly probable"); In re S.Z., 547 N.W.2d 886,
893 (Minn. 1996) (stating that the trial court's findings must be "supported by substantial
evidence and are not clearly erroneous" and that "[t]his court gives some deference to the
district court, but closely inquires into the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether
the evidence is clear and convincing"); In re M.J.A., 826 S.W.2d 890, 896 (Mo. Ct. App.
1992) (stating that "we will affirm the judgment unless there is no substantial evidence to
support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the
law"); In re Eventyr J., 902 P.2d 1066, 1069 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that "[o]ur standard of review is therefore whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party, the fact finder could properly determine that the clear and convincing
evidence standard was met"); In re Scott, 383 S.E.2d 690, 691 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (stating
that "[i]n cases involving a higher evidentiary standard ... we must review the evidence in
order to determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence") (quoting In re Montgomery, 316 S.E.2d 246, 253 (N.C. Ct. 1984); In re Adoption of Holcomb, 481 N.E.2d 613, 621 (Ohio 1985) (stating that "[o]nce the clear and convincing standard has been met to the satisfaction of the probate court, the reviewing court
must examine the record and determine if the trier of fact had sufficient evidence before it
to satisfy this burden of proof" and that "[t]he determination of the probate court should
not be overturned unless it is unsupported by clear and convincing evidence").
285. A fair number of jurisdictions appear to apply the "clear error" standard of review,
which the Texas Supreme Court views as "similar, although not identical" to the Texas
"abuse of discretion" standard. Goode v. Shoukfeh, 943 S.W.2d 441, 446 (Tex. 1997). See,
e.g., Varnadore v. State Dep't of Human Resources, 543 So. 2d 1194, 1196 (Ala. Civ. App.
1989) (stating that "[t]he trial court is presented the evidence ore tenus; therefore, its decision is presumed to be correct and will be set aside only if the record reveals the decision to
be plainly and palpably wrong"); In re S.A. v. State, 912 P.2d 1235, 1237 (Alaska 1996)
(stating that "we will overturn the superior court's findings of facts if they are clearly erroneous. We will declare a trial court's findings to be clearly erroneous if a review of the
entire record leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.");
In re Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-8441, 857 P.2d 1317, 1319 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1993) (stating that "the issue on appeal is whether any reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court's findings" and that "[o]n appeal, this court will accept the findings
of the juvenile court unless they are clearly erroneous; we will not reweigh the evidence");
In re Romance M., 641 A.2d 378, 383 (Conn. 1994) (stating that "[w]e will overturn such a
finding of fact only if it is clearly erroneous in light of the evidence in the whole record");
Ct. App. 1991) (stating as a "well settled" rule that
In re L.L.S., 577 N.E.2d 1375, 1385 (Ill.
"[tihe findings of the trial court must be given great deference since it has the opportunity
to view and evaluate the testimony of the witnesses, and the trial court's decision should
not be reversed on appeal unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence")
(quoting In re Allen, 527 N.E.2d 647, 651 (Ill. Ct. App. 1988); In re G.A., 664 So. 2d 106,
110 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that a trial court's decision will be reversed only if "manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong"); In re Springer, 432 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Mich. Ct. App.
1988) (stating that "[t]he appropriate standard of review in cases involving termination of
parental rights is whether the findings of the probate court are clearly erroneous," and
defining that standard as satisfied "when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made"); In re P.E., 934 P.2d 206, 209 (Mont. 1997) (stating a "clearly
erroneous" standard of review); People ex rel. South Dakota Dep't of Soc. Servs., 510
N.W.2d 119, 121 (S.D. 1993) (stating a "clearly erroneous" standard of review); M.S. v.
Lochner, 815 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (stating that "[w]e overturn findings of
fact in a parental termination proceeding only if they are clearly erroneous," adding, "[t]o
obtain a reversal on clear error grounds, an appellant must marshal all the evidence supporting the challenged findings and then show that despite that evidence, the findings are
clearly lacking in support"); In re G.S., 572 A.2d 1350, 1351 (Vt. 1990) (stating that "[a]s
long as the court applied the proper standard, we will not disturb its findings unless they
are clearly erroneous, and we will affirm its conclusions if they are supported by the
findings").
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286
almost non-existent review.
It appears that the Texas courts that favor a stricter appellate standard
have a somewhat stronger argument. First, the old decisions on which
other courts rely are suspect because they assume an unconstitutionally
low burden of proof at trial. Second, in view of the great regard the Texas
Supreme Court recently has shown for parental rights, 287 it would be
anomalous to apply a low-level standard of appellate review.
Finally, a good argument can be made that failure to apply a higher
standard of review on appeal is a constitutional violation. Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc.2 88 offers a productive analogy.
The question in Bose was whether the normal federal "clearly erroneous"
standard of appellate review 289 governed the appeal of a defamation case,
of independent review of proof of
despite the constitutional requirement
"actual malice" offered at trial.2 90 After observing that the conflict between the two requirements "is in some respects more apparent than
real,"' 291 the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that "[a]ppellate judges in
whether
such a case must exercise independent judgment and determine
292
clarity.
convincing
with
malice
actual
the record establishes
Parental rights are no less fundamental than rights of free speech. It
would therefore seem that a more searching standard of review than that
employed by a number of Texas appellate courts is in order. Moreover,

286. See, e.g., In re A.R., 679 A.2d 470, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating that "[t]he trial
court's determination as to whether this standard has been met is reviewable only for
abuse of discretion"); In re Baby E.A.W., 647 So.2d 918, 923 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(stating that "a trial court's determination that evidence is clear and convincing will not be
overturned unless it may be said as a matter of law that no one could reasonably find such
evidence to be clear and convincing"); In re S.M.Q., 796 P.2d 543, 544 (Kan. 1990) (stating
that "[t]he applicable scope of review ... is not whether the record contains substantial
competent evidence of a clear and convincing nature but whether there is substantial competent evidence in the record to support the trial court's decision that the parent was unfit
and that parental rights should be terminated"); K.L.H. v. State, 858 P.2d 1296,1299 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1993) (stating that "[i]n a termination proceeding tried to a jury, the verdict of the
jury is conclusive as to all disputed facts, and where there is any competent evidence reasonably tending to support the verdict, we will not disturb the judgment based on that
verdict"); In re C.A.E., 532 A.2d 802, 803 (Pa. 1987) (stating that "the scope of appellate
review . . . is limited to the determination of whether the decree of termination is supported by competent evidence"); In re S.Y.M., 924 P.2d 985, 987 (Wyo. 1996) (stating that
termination decisions are the subject of "strict scrutiny," but adding, "[e]xacting though
such scrutiny may be, we undertake examination of the evidence in a light most favorable
to the party prevailing below, assuming all favorable evidence to be true while discounting
conflicting evidence presented by the unsuccessful party").
287. See, e.g., In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1994) (expanding Texas constitutional
rights of biological father beyond those afforded under the United States Constitution).
288. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
289. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (stating that "[f]indings of fact ... shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge of the credibility of the witnesses").
290. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-86 (1964) (stating that an
appellate court is required to "make an independent examination of the whole record" to
assure that "the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free
expression").
291. Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 499.
292. Id. at 514.
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given the U.S. Supreme Court's concern with the provision of an appellate record in a termination case, 293 it is difficult to imagine that the
Court would require a full record be provided, yet countenance a standard of appellate review that would afford the record no significant
review.
Whatever the proper resolution of the issue it is ripe for the Texas
Supreme Court's consideration. More than two years ago, the Texarkana
Court of Appeals, though deciding not to apply a new intermediate standard of review for termination cases, summarized conflicting cases and
noted: "[I]n light of this uncertainty, we believe it might be appropriate
for the supreme court to revisit this issue. '294 The Texas Supreme
Court's decision not to grant review in that case was disappointing, and
the situation is only getting worse. Perhaps the Texas Supreme Court is
waiting for further guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court or perhaps the
court feels that any announced standard of appellate review is so difficult
to establish that the precise words of the review formula might not make
any practical difference. Nonetheless, until the issue is addressed by the
U.S. Supreme Court, it would be more practical to have all the Texas
appellate courts (in particular, the two that share overlapping appellate
jurisdiction in Houston) using the same standard of review.
The 1997 Legislature was active on termination issues as well. Several
more specific grounds for termination of parental rights have been added.
These include voluntary misconduct that results in a prison sentence of
two years or more, death or serious injury to a child while engaged in one
of a laundry list of criminal violations, repeated drug use that endangers a
child, conduct that causes a child to be born addicted to drugs, or failure
to comply with a court order specifying conditions for return of a child in
the care of state authorities. 295 A new statutory provision provides that
parental rights can be terminated when the pregnancy is the result of a
criminal sexual assault. 296 Finally, another new section provides a sixmonth limit on direct and collateral attacks of termination orders. 297
Several termination decisions from the courts of appeal are worth brief
note. The San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of a
mother's parental rights because of appellate error. 298 The mother's due
process and equal protection claims were over ruled with the observation
that "the strict application of the time limits regarding filing of the statement of facts did not deprive the parent[ ] of due process or [equal pro293. See supra notes 193-209 and accompanying text.
294. In re J.J., 911 S.W.2d at 440 n.1.
295. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(L), (0) - (R) (Vernon Supp. 1998); see also
supra note 249 and accompanying text.
296. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.007 (Vernon 1996).
297. See id. § 161.211.
298. Guerra v. Texas Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 940 S.W.2d 295 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1997, n.w.h.) (disregarding late-filed statement of facts and refusing to
go behind a brief filed by reluctant appellate counsel).
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tection of this] law."'2 99 The Houston Court of Appeals (Fourteenth
District) affirmed the termination of a presumed father's rights on endangerment grounds despite the fact that a ruling had not yet been made on
the man's suit to establish paternity. 30 0 In the "no great surprise" category, the Waco Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of parental
rights as to three children in large part because the father admitted to
sexually abusing his seven-year-old daughter. 30 1 The Eastland Court of
Appeals, 30 2 citing constitutional concerns, also refused to apply the new
"constructively abandoned" ground 30 3 to a case in which the children had
not been in the state's care for at least one year after the effective date of
30 4
the statute, despite legislative language that is arguably contrary.
In Cornelison v. Newbury, 30 5 the Waco Court of Appeals reversed a

summary judgment terminating parental rights in an adoption setting.
The biological mother, Ms. Newbury, left her newborn child with the
Cornelisons, who were named temporary managing conservators. The
mother expressed an interest in having the Cornelisons adopt her child
and obtained from the biological father a waiver of interest, but did not
sign an affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights herself. No later
than six weeks after birth, Ms. Newbury indicated that she wished to reclaim the child. The Cornelisons responded by filing suit to terminate
Ms. Newbury's rights on the theory that she had "voluntarily left the child
alone or in the possession of another not the parent and expressed an
intent not to return" 30 6 and obtained summary judgment. The court of
appeals reversed on the ground that there was some evidence of nonabandonment, 30 7 but expressed considerable concern about the birth
30 8
mother's subsequent actions.
299. Id. at 298 (quoting Krasniqi v. Dallas County Child Protective Servs. Unit of Texas
Dep't of Human Servs., 809 S.W.2d 927, 932, (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied), cert.

denied, 503 U.S. 1006 (1992)).
300. See R.W. v. Texas Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 944 S.W.2d 437 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, n.w.h.). The man had left the child alone with its cocaine-abusing, suicidal mother. The court acknowledged that under some circumstances
the decision to terminate rights before an adjudication of paternity might be unfair, but
emphasized that the man was a presumed father and had never denied paternity.
301. See Lucas v. Texas Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 949 S.W.2d 500 (Tex.
App.-Waco 1997, pet. filed).
302. See In re R.A.T., 938 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1997, writ denied).
303. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(N) (Vernon 1996).

304. See In re R.A.T., 938 S.W.2d at 784 n.2 (noting that the implementing language
stated that the amendment applies to "a pending suit affecting the parent-child relationship
without regard to whether the suit was commenced before, on, or after the effective date").
305. 932 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. App.-Waco 1996, no writ).
306. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(A) (Vernon 1996).

307. The birth mother's affidavit stated that she changed her mind about the adoption
"almost immediately" and contacted the Cornelisons within two weeks. This evidence,
however, was controverted at trial. Cornelison, 932 S.W.2d at 731.
308. The Cornelisons' affidavit stated that Ms. Newbury "did not take any initiative to
see the child ....... did not send gifts to the child or any money to the Cornelisons to help
defray the expense of caring for the child, and that she did not ever inquire about the
child's well-being." Id. at 732. The Waco court commented that these actions, if true, are
"inconsistent with [the] assertion" that Ms. Newbury changed her mind "almost immediately." Id.
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The 1997 legislative session made several changes in adoption law.
New provisions provide for adoption by a former step-parent if parental
rights have been terminated as to one biological parent. 30 9 Background
checks are now required for all prospective adoptive parents unless the
adoption is by a close relative. 310 Adoption hearings are granted preferential settings on request, 311 and direct and collateral attacks on adoptions are limited to a six-month period. 31 2 Finally, courts are now
required to provide adoptive and biological parents who are in the prowith information relating to the
cess of relinquishing parental rights
313
state's voluntary adoption registry.
In the sole adoption decision of note during the Survey period, the
Texas Supreme Court addressed an adoptive child's rights to information
about her natural parents. In Little v. Smith,3 14 the petitioner sought to
assert inheritance rights to her biological grandmother's estate. Adopted
in 1932, Katherine Smith knew from age ten that she was adopted. However, Ms. Smith did not begin to seek information relating to her birth
parents until her son was diagnosed with a malignant tumor in 1987. She
eventually discovered information that her adoptive mother had kept,
substantiated by redacted records released by the adoption agency, giving
the names of the persons believed to be her biological parents. When
Smith contacted her "uncle," however, he informed her that her mother
had died some twenty years earlier. He also expressed doubt as to the
truth of Smith's story. Ms. Smith did further research in newspaper and
court records, and discovered that her "grandmother" had died in 1982,
leaving a substantial estate of which her "uncle" was executor.
Ms. Smith brought suit in 1992, seeking her share of the estate. The
estate defended on statute of limitations and public policy grounds, arguing that even if one assumed for summary judgment purposes that Ms.
Smith's "uncle" knew his sister had given up an out-of-wedlock child for
adoption, adoption records were sealed and it would have been impractical to seek out Ms. Smith. Smith argued that a discovery rule should
apply, and the court of appeals agreed, at least to the extent of her tort
claims against the executor "uncle."
The Texas Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment in favor of
the estate beneficiaries. The Court noted the general public policy in
favor of statutes of limitation and the fact that limitation statutes in estate
matters "provide stability and security to personal affairs and protect
property rights. ' 315 The Court, however, also acknowledged the difficulty that adoptees might encounter in trying to ascertain the identities of
their biological parents. The Court's solution was to rely on the Legisla309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.001(b)(3), (4) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
See id. § 162.0025.
See id. § 162.0045.
See id. § 162.012 (Vernon 1996).
See id. § 162.018(d) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
943 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1997).
Id. at 417 (quoting Mooney v. Harlin, 622 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. 1981)).
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ture to decide between competing public policies, and to take the statutory scheme governing confidentiality of adoption records as evidence of
that priority. Under the Family Code, detailed information about birth
parents is available; 3 16 names and specific identifying information, however, are redacted 317 and can be obtained only upon a court order based
on "good cause. ' 31 8 The Court intimated that general curiosity about
possible inheritance rights would not constitute good cause, 319 though
medical necessity might. Moreover, the State's elaborate adoption registry statutes in the Court's view,320 "are designed to maintain the confidentiality of the identities of adoptees, their natural parents, and
biological siblings unless there is a mutual desire for that information to
be disclosed."'321 For similar reasons, Smith's tort claims against her "uncle" executor were also barred.

316. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.007 (Vernon 1996).

317. See, e.g., id. § 162.006.
318. See id. § 162.022.
319. The opinion states that "[t]he statutes contain no indication that an adoptee can
circumvent these [voluntary adoption registry] procedures simply by asking a court to open
the adoption records so that any inheritance rights can be asserted." Little, 943 S.W.2d at
419.
320. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 162.401-.422 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 1998).
321. Little, 943 S.W.2d at 419 (emphasis added).

